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THEP ATHS NOTTAKEN:THE SUPREME 
COURT'S FAILURES IN DICKERSON 
Paul G. Cassell* 
"Where's the rest of the opinion?" That was my immediate reac­
tion to reading the Supreme Court's terse decision in Dickerson, de­
livered to me via email from the clerk's office a few minutes after its 
release. Surely, I thought, some glitch in the transmission had elimi­
nated the pages of discussion on the critical issues in the case. Yet, as 
it became clear that I had received all of the Court's opinion, my in­
credulity grew. 
Just six months earlier, the Court had appointed me to defend my 
victory in the Fourth Circuit, where I had persuaded that court to hold 
that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 validly replaced the "prophylactic" Miranda re­
quirements as the standard for the admissibility of confessions in fed­
eral court.1 My appointment stemmed from the Justice Department's 
virtually unprecedented decision to align itself with the criminal de­
fendant it was prosecuting in arguing against admitting his confession. 
The Department and Dickerson filed briefs urging reversal of the 
Fourth Circuit, supported by amicus briefs from the ACLU and sev­
eral other civil rights organizations. I responded with a brief defending 
the Fourth Circuit's decision, supported by amicus briefs from the 
United States House of Representatives, leading Senators, seventeen 
states, and many of the nation's law enforcement officials, prosecutors, 
* James I. Farr Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law (cas­
sellp@law.utah.edu). Thanks to those who offered suggestions on this Article, especially the 
participants in this Symposium. Thanks also to the lawyers who helped me fight the good 
fight during Dickerson in various ways, including Doug Beloof, Reg Brown, David Castro, 
Dan Collins, Ted Cooperstein, Doug Cox, Bob Cyncar, Ron Eisenberg, Miguel 
Estrada, Bruce Fein, Joe Grano, Sarah Hart, Chuck Hobson, Bob Hoyt, Gary Malphrus, Jim 
Manek, Josh Marquis, Andy McBride, Edwin Meese III, Greg Munson, Michael O'Neil, 
Patrick Philbin, Rick Romley, Devallis Rutledge, Kyle Sampson, Kent Scheidegger, Chris 
Simpkins, Scott Sommerville, David Wilson, Ken Woodington, and especially Paul 
Kamenar, Bill Otis, Lee Otis, and Trish Cassell. 
I also want to extend a special note of thanks to Yale Kamisar for suggesting this 
Symposium and, more generally, for all the interest he has shown in my work over the years. 
In fact, my desire to pursue the Dickerson litigation was prompted, in part, by Yale's admis­
sion to me a few years ago that he "wasn't sure" what the Supreme Court would do if it ever 
faced § 3501. Yale, I should never have let you convince me to throw Miranda into the briar 
patch! 
1. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999). For background of the litiga­
tion leading to the Fourth Circuit's decision, see Paul G. Cassell, The Statute that Time For­
got: 18 U.S. C. § 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175, 208-23 (1999). 
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and victims' organizations. At oral argument in April, an active Court2 
wrestled with the contending positions. Meanwhile, the press and 
public awaited what many projected would be, regardless of the out­
come, a landmark ruling. 
Yet the case ended with a whimper, rather than a bang. On June 
26, 2000, the Court announced it had reversed the decision below. The 
rationale for the reversal was only briefly sketched out. The entire 
majority opinion spans just a few pages (about eight in West's 
Supreme Court Reporter).3 Only about half of those pages address the 
substantive constitutional issues.4 The opinion briefly concludes that 
Miranda announced a "constitutional rule," had "constitutional un­
derpinnings," and was "constitutionally based."5 Surprisingly, at no 
point does the majority explicate precisely what this means. Justice 
Scalia's dissent highlights a critical omission in the majority opinion: 
It takes only a small step ... [for the Court to] come out and say quite 
clearly: "We reaffirm today that custodial interrogation that is not pre­
ceded by Miranda warnings or their equivalent violates the Constitution 
of the United States." It cannot say that, because a majority of the Court 
does not believe it.6 
One would think this a sufficiently important issue for the majority to 
respond to it - either to affirm or deny the claim. Yet the majority 
did not trouble itself to answer. 
The description of Miranda as a "constitutional rule" was sufficient 
to achieve the Court's apparent twin aims: striking down § 3501 while 
leaving in place its various decisions crafting exceptions to Miranda.7 
2. I was interrupted for questions approximately sixty-two times in my thirty minute ar-
gument. 
3. Dickerson v. United States, 1 20 S. Ct. 2326, 2329-37 (2000). 
4. See 1 20 S. Ct. at 2332-37. 
5. Id. at 2334. 
6. Id. at 2337 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
7. Others in this Symposium have articulated at great length reasons for believing 
Dickerson does not change Miranda doctrine. See Yale Kamisar, Foreword: From Miranda 
to § 3501 to Dickerson to . . .  , 99 MICH. L. REV. 879, 893-94 (2001) ("What has been reaf­
firmed, at least as far as the Chief Justice is concerned, is not the Miranda doctrine as it burst 
on the scene in 1966, but Miranda with all its exceptions attached . . . .  "); Susan R. Klein, 
Identifying and (Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1071 (arguing that Dickerson 
"holds that the law is to stay exactly as it was pre-Dickerson"); George C. Thomas I II, Sepa­
rated at Birth but Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases, 99 MICH. 
L. REV. 1081, 1 1 1 2  (2001) (arguing that Dickerson leaves exceptions to Miranda in place, but 
locating Miranda rule in the Due Process Clause); see also Charles D. Weisselberg, In the 
Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1 1 21 ,  1162 (2001) (noting that Dickerson 
"left Miranda standing, but with all of the exceptions and modifications that have been 
crafted during the last thirty-four years"). This conclusion seems unassailable, although an 
intermediate appellate court from Colorado disagrees. See People v. Trujillo, 2000 WL 
1862933 (Colo. App. 2000). Both the text and rationale of Dickerson require leaving the pre­
Dickerson exceptions in place, as the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained in a carefully 
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But this result-oriented "success" came at the great cost of any pre­
tense of consistency in the Court's doctrine. For example, Dickerson's 
assertion that Miranda created a "constitutional" rule contradicts nu­
merous clear statements in earlier opinions. Surprisingly, these state­
ments can be traced to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of the 
Dickerson opinion. Although Miranda itself contains constitutional 
language, then-Justice Rehnquist had written as early as 1974 in 
Michigan v. Tucker" that Miranda's safeguards were "not themselves 
rights protected by the Constitution . . . .  "9 From this premise, the 
Court allowed derivative evidence from a non-Mirandized statement 
to be used against a defendant because "the police conduct at issue 
here did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the prophylac­
tic standards" of Miranda.10 Building on Tucker, in a series of cases 
spanning nearly three decades, the Court repeated the characteriza­
tion of Miranda rules as "prophylactic" and relied on that rationale to 
limit the reach of Miranda.11 At the same time, numerous federal 
courts of appeals reaching the issue had understood these statements 
to mean that Miranda rights were not constitutional in character.12 In­
deed, no less than the preeminent academic defender of Miranda -
Yale Kamisar - had also seemingly acknowledged that, under pre­
vailing doctrine, Miranda rights were not constitutionally required.13 
reasoned decision. See State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75 (Ten. 2001) (pre-Dickerson exceptions 
to Miranda remain good law). 
8. 417 U.S. 433 (1974) 
9. Id. at 444. 
10. Id. at 445-446 
11 .  See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994) (noting that Miranda is 
"one of a series of recommended procedural safeguards" that are "not themselves rights 
protected by the Constitution"); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 & n.1(1985) (holding 
that "a simple failure to administer Miranda warnings is not in itself a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment"); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (1984) ("[T]he failure to provide 
Miranda warnings in and of itself does not render a confession involuntary."). 
12. See, e.g., Mahan v. Plymouth County House of Corrections, 64 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 
1995); DeShawn v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 346 (2d Cir. 1998); Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 
1256 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135, 1 142 (4th Cir. 1997); United States 
v. Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 168-70 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 182 (1998); United 
States v. Davis, 919 F.2d 1181, 1 186 (6th Cir. 1990), reh'g en bane denied, 1991 U.S. App. 
Lexis 3934; Clay v. Brown, 1998 U.S. App. Lexis 17115, reported in table format, 151 F.3d 
1032 (7th Cir.); Winsett v. Washington, 130 F.3d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1997); Warren v. City of 
Lincoln, 864 F.2d 1436, 1441-42 (8th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989); 
United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467, 472-73 (9th Cir. 1977); Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 
1347, 1350-51 (10th Cir. 1994); Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1976). 
13. Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and 
Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929, 970 (1995) [hereinafter Kamisar, "Fruits"] 
("According to a majority of the present Court, [failure to follow Miranda] does not seem to 
violate a constitutional right at all."). In a more detailed discussion of these issues, Kamisar 
explained (accurately, it turns out!) why Miranda nonetheless has constitutional foundations. 
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This issue of the Court's "deconstitutionalization" of Miranda lies 
at the heart of the question presented in Dickerson. Yet, by my count, 
the majority opinion devotes only three substantive sentences to ex­
plaining why the Court's own, repeated statements should not be 
taken at face value. The majority acknowledges that "language" in 
some of its earlier opinions supports the view that Miranda rights are 
not constitutionally required. But, the majority says, these cases prove 
not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule, but only that "no consti­
tutional rule is immutable."14 Instead, asserts the majority, such excep­
tions are a "normal part of constitutional law."15 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist does not pause to offer any explanation why then that lan­
guage had been used in more than a half-dozen Supreme Court opin­
ions on various Miranda issues. 
The majority's cursory treatment of this central issue leaves 
Miranda doctrine incoherent. As others in this Symposium have 
pointed out,16 there is no rationale for numerous results over the last 
twenty-five years. Why can the "fruits" of Miranda violations be used 
against a defendant? The traditional rule excludes fruits of, for exam­
ple, unconstitutional searches.17 In Oregon v. Elstad, the Court said 
very specifically that the reason for not following the Fourth 
Amendment rule in the Miranda context was that "a simple failure to 
administer Miranda warnings is not in itself a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment."18 The majority in Dickerson viewed these statements 
not as "prov[ing] that Miranda is a nonconstitutional decision" but 
rather that "unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are 
different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth 
Amendment."19 Again, in its haste to dispose of the case, the Court 
See Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 883, 936-
50 (2000) [hereinafter Kamisar, Congress]. 
14. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2335 (2000). 
15. Id. 
16. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 7, at 895 ("I usually discount criticism of a case when 
made by losing counsel, but this time I am sympathetic when Paul Cassell complains [about] 
the 'skimpy, jerry-built opinion . . . .  '"); Klein, supra note 7, at 1071 (characterizing the "terri­
ble" Dickerson opinion as a "squandered opportunity to rationalize contradictory case 
law."); David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958, 
958 (2001) ("It is not clear that the majority opinion ever really answered" the central ques­
tions posed in the case.); see also Barry Friedman & Michael C. Dorf, Shared Constitutional 
Interpretation After Dickerson, N.Y.U. Law School Public Law and Legal Theory, Research 
Paper No. 13 (Fall 2000) (concluding "a. Court brimming with its own importance has paid 
insufficient attention to its core obligation: to explain the basis for its decisions. That short­
coming is nowhere more obvious than in the line of post-Miranda cases culminating in 
Dickerson."). 
17. E.g., Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-43 (1939). 
18. Oregon 'v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298�.
306 n.1 (1985). 
19. 120 S. Ct. at 2335. 
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did not tarry to explain the difference.20 Similarly, in New York v. 
Quarles, the Court carved out a "public safety" exception to Miranda. 
The Fifth Amendment admits of no such public safety exception; the 
. police cannot coerce an involuntary statement from a suspect and use 
it against him even if there are strong public safety reasons for doing 
so. The rationale Quarles gave, however, was that the Miranda rules 
were nonconstitutional rules subject to modification by the Court.21 
Dickerson hazards no attempt at explaining Quarles. In short, as Jus­
tice Scalia's dissent cogently argues, the Court in Dickerson behaved 
like "some sort of nine-headed Caesar, giving thumbs-up or thumbs­
down to whatever outcome, case by case, suits or offends its collective 
fancy."22 Or, as Akhil Amar has written, Dickerson reads like little 
more than the pronouncement: "The Great and Powerful Oz Has 
Spoken!"23 
While other authors in this Symposium have discussed aspects of 
this doctrinal incoherence at some length,24 the point I pursue here is 
whether this doctrinal incoherence was necessary. Perhaps the Court 
simply had no choice in the face of irreconcilable lines of cases. My 
thesis is that Dickerson could have been written coherently - that the 
Court could have crafted other resolutions that would have allowed it 
to harmonize its doctrine far more effectively than the skimpy, jerry­
built opinion the Court announced. 
Part I describes a different path the Court could have taken to rec­
oncile both its decisions describing Miranda as a sub-constitutional 
rule and those applying Miranda to the states. The Court could have 
treated Miranda as a form of constitutional common law, an interim 
court-created remedy for the enforcement of Fifth Amendment rights. 
That path would have been more consistent with Dickerson's empha­
sis on respect for precedent and would have effectively reconciled all 
of the Miranda cases. 
Part II articulates still another path the Court could have followed 
to sustain § 3501. The Court could have concluded that § 3501, bol­
stered by improved tort remedies and other post-Miranda innovations 
in the law, provided a viable substitute to Miranda. 
Part III lays out yet another path available to the Court for sus­
taining § 3501 - and harmonizing its decisions. This section explains 
20. This point is pursued in more detail, and in more powerful prose, in 120 S. Ct. 2326, 
2342-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
21. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658 n.7 (1984) (justifying holding on the 
ground that "absent actual coercion by the officer, there is no constitutional imperative re­
quiring the exclusion of the evidence that results from police inquiry of this kind"). 
22. 120 S. Ct. at 2342 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
23. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 1 14 HARV. L. REV. 
26, 89 n.212 (2000). 
24. See supra note 16. 
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how the Court's assertion of its power to promulgate Miranda con­
flicted with its more recent decision in City of Boerne v. Flores.25 
Boerne regulated congressional enforcement of constitutional rights, 
adding a "congruence and proportionality" requirement to any en­
forcement scheme. Applying Boerne to judicial enforcement of Fifth 
Amendment rights - that is, to Miranda - reveals that Miranda's ex­
clusionary rule lacks "congruence and proportionality" to the under­
lying Fifth Amendment. The Court could have solved these problems 
by viewing Miranda as creating a presumption of involuntariness that 
could be rebutted by the prosecution. 
Part IV addresses one last conflict between Dickerson and settled 
doctrine. In Dickerson, the Court gives as a ground for not overruling 
Miranda the lack of any significant harm to law enforcement. But 
Congress has reached precisely the opposite conclusion. In numerous 
other cases involving disputed factual questions, the Court has given 
deference to congressional findings. Dickerson should have followed 
these other decisions in evaluating whether to modify Miranda to up­
hold § 3501. 
Part V concludes with an exploration of how Dickerson might have 
encouraged Congress to adopt alternatives to Miranda - alternatives 
like videotaping of police interrogation - that might have offered a 
way of better protecting suspects' rights during questioning and soci­
ety's interest in obtaining voluntary confessions. The absence of any 
discussion of alternatives to Miranda is Dickerson's most serious fail­
ure. 
I .  SECTION 3501 AS M ODIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
COMMON LAW 
Perhaps the simplest way for the Court to reconcile its various 
pronouncements was to treat Miranda as a form of "constitutional 
common law," to use the phrase made famous in Henry Monaghan's 
1975 article in the Harvard Law Review.26 Under this view, the 
Miranda rules are interim remedies not required by the Constitution, 
but designed in the absence of legislation to assist in protecting consti­
tutional rights. The Court has exercised such power in other cases, 
perhaps most notably in the 1971 decision Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Federal Narcotics Agents.27 There the Court created the right to sue 
the federal government for violations of constitutional rights - the so­
called Bivens remedy. The Court has also crafted a judicially-devised 
remedy for enforcing Fourth Amendment rights - the exclusionary 
25. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
26. Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REY. 1 ,  
42 (1975). 
27. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
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rule of Mapp v. Ohio.28 Because the Court has crafted extraconstitu­
tional measures, like the exclusionary rule, to protect constitutional 
rights from infringement by the states,29 this understanding of Miranda 
is consistent with its application to the states.30 
For present purposes, the salient feature of constitutional common 
law is that it is subject to change - change by the Court and, in ap­
propriate cases, by Congress. The Bivens doctrine illustrates this evo­
lutionary aspect. In subsequent cases, the Court has allowed Congress 
to modify the Bivens structure, so long as an alternative adequate to 
protect constitutional rights remains in place. In Bush v. Lucas,31 for 
instance, the Court refused to allow a Bivens action by a federal 
worker for a violation of First Amendment rights because Congress 
had created a different remedy through federal personnel statutes. In 
reaching this holding, the Court recognized that the other remedy was 
not as fully effective as a judicially-created damages remedy.32 None­
theless, the Court explained that the touchstone for assessing the con­
stitutionality of Congress's remedial regime was not whether it 
matched in every respect the judicially-devised regime for which it 
substituted. Rather, the touchstone was whether the congressional re­
gime provided "meaningful" protection for the constitutional right at 
issue. If it did, then its strength compared to the judicially-devised 
scheme was irrelevant.33 
Similarly, in Smith v. Robbins, a case decided just a few months be­
fore Dickerson, the Court held that its procedure for dealing with 
frivolous appeals could be superseded by a California procedure.34 In 
words that echo the cases interpreting Miranda, the Court said that 
the procedure imposed on the states by Anders v. California35 was 
simply a "prophylactic framework" and not "a constitutional com­
mand." Accordingly, California could substitute an alternative proce-
28. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
29. E.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 391-95 (1971); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 655-60 (1961). See also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1983) (discussing ap­
plication of enforcement measures to the states). 
30. The search and seizure exclusionary rule is different from Miranda's exclusionary 
rule because it is a remedy for actual violations of the Fourth Amendment. Adopting an 
analogous approach in the Fifth Amendment context would mean suppressing evidence only 
in cases in which a defendant's constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination has 
actually been violated. This is precisely the approach of § 3501. 
31. 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
32. Id. at 372-73, 377. 
33. Id. at 368, 386-90; see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988) (remedial 
regime replacing judicially-devised one upheld because it contained "meaningful safe­
guards" for the constitutional rights at issue even though it failed to provide as "complete 
relief'' as a Bivens remedy). 
34. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000). 
35. 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
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<lure. The Robbins Court warned that "any view . . .  that converted 
[the Anders procedure] from a suggestion into a straitjacket would 
contravene [our] established practice of allowing the States wide dis­
cretion, subject to the minimum requirements of the [Constitution], to 
experiment with solutions to difficult policy problems."36 The test for 
whether the substitute California procedure was constitutional was 
whether it provided the "minimum safeguards" to protect the constitu­
tional right at issue.37 
Under a constitutional common law approach, the Dickerson case 
could have been resolved straightforwardly in a way that reconciled 
Miranda with its progeny. Like the interim measures in Bivens and 
Anders, the Court could have viewed the Miranda rules as an interim 
"prophylactic framework" designed to safeguard Fifth Amendment 
rights. This would justify Miranda, since the Court is free (as in Bivens 
and Anders) to craft rules that assist in the enforcement of constitu­
tional rights. At the same time, this view would fit precisely the lan­
guage and rationale of post-Miranda exceptions cases - Tucker, 
Quarles, Elstad, and the like - whieh were predicated on Miranda as 
a "prophylactic" device. Indeed, Justice Harlan's concurring opinion 
in Bivens even used the phrase "prophylactic measures" to describe 
the Bivens remedial device, the same phrase that the Court would 
later use to describe the Miranda rules.38 
Under this view of Miranda, Congress can replace the Miranda 
rules provided it leaves in place "meaningful safeguards." Section 3501 
meets this test. As explained more fully below, § 3501 fully protects 
against the admission of compelled statements in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment.39 Congress, of course, has no authority to modify the 
content of constitutional rights either directly or under the guise of its 
remedial powers.40 By the same token, it could not abrogate a judi­
cially-devised protective measure necessary to the survival of a consti­
tutional right. But that is very different from saying that Congress has 
no authority to modify a ruling that "overprotects" a constitutional 
right, as Miranda's automatic rule excluding all unwarned custodial 
statements clearly does.41 Overprotection means protection beyond 
what the Constitution requires. It is in precisely that area that Con-
36. Smith, 528 U.S. at 273. 
37. Id. at 276. 
38. E.g., Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987). 
39. See infra notes 72-94 and accompanying text (discussing safeguards against coerced 
confessions provided by § 3501 and other measures). 
40: City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997). 
41. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (Miranda "sweeps more broadly than the 
Fifth Amendment itself'); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 209 (1989) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) ("(T]he Miranda rule 'overprotects' the value at stake."). 
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gress must be free to fashion or modify rules as it thinks wisest.42 In­
deed, if Congress had no role in making independent judgments about 
what the law should be once constitutional requirements are satisfied, 
it is difficult to see that it would have any role at all. Rules required by 
the Constitution and rules beyond those required by the Constitution 
together exhaust the universe of rules. If the judicial branch is em­
powered to establish for all time the latter as well as the former, then 
there is nothing left for Congress to do.43 
This line of argument was presented in my brief.44 Yet the majority 
opinion does not explain why it preferred instead to repudiate, sub si­
lencio, the rationale of Tucker, Quarles, Elstad. Nor does the Court 
explain why it relies on ambiguous implications from dicta in Miranda 
to trump specific discussions in the Court's later opinions explicating 
Miranda. Instead, the Court's response was essentially to cloud the 
distinction between constitutional requirements and nonconstitutional 
protective measures. The Court carried out this strategy through a vir­
tual army of seemingly refined phrases - "constitutionally rooted," 
"of constitutional dimension" and the like - to characterize 
Miranda's status. But these characterizations do nothing to resolve, 
and in fact seem designed to obscure, the fundamental incoherence of 
the Court's position: admitting that confessions obtained in violation 
of Miranda do not always amount to compelled self-incrimination, but 
maintaining nonetheless that it is unconstitutional for Congress to 
permit the admission of such statements even if they have been shown 
to be voluntary under conventional Fifth Amendment principles.45 
42. See Smith, 528 U.S. at 284 ("We address not what is prudent or appropriate, but only 
what is constitutionally compelled.") (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 n.38 
(1984)); cf. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.11  (1959). 
43. Professor Strauss's interesting article in this Symposium takes the view that Miranda 
should be viewed as part and parcel of ordinary constitutional jurisprudence, akin to the in­
terpretation of the First Amendment rights found in, for example, New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Strauss, supra note 16, at 960-66. On this view, Strauss ar­
gues, the Court properly struck down § 3501 because it was not "as good or better" than the 
constitutional Miranda rules. Id. at 969-70. The difficulty with this argument from analogy, 
however, is that it requires a justification for analogizing Miranda to the "constitutional" 
interpretation exemplified by Sullivan rather than to the "prophylactic" interpretation ex­
emplified by Bivens. If I read him correctly, Strauss fails to offer any explanation for viewing 
Miranda as akin to Sullivan rather than to Bivens. As I have tried to argue here, the case for 
the Bivens analogy is strong. Unlike the Sullivan analogy, a Bivens analogy fits both the ter­
minology of Miranda doctrine (e.g., "prophylactic rule") and its practical effects ("overpro­
tection" of the right, replacement by Congress, etc.). Of course, if the Bivens analogy is cor­
rect, Congress was free to replace the Miranda rule not with a rule that was, in Strauss's 
terms, "as good or better" than Miranda, but rather with one that satisfied the constitutional 
minimum. See supra notes 32 - 33. 
44. See Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Urging Affirmance of the Judgment 
Below at 4-28, United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-5525). This 
document, and many others related to the Dickerson case, are available on my website at 
www.law.utah.edu/cassell [hereinafter Cassell website]. 
45. Professor Schulhofer's provocative contribution to this Symposium argues that all of 
the Justices in Dickerson share some misconception that Fifth Amendment rights during cus-
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Dickerson implicitly assumes that, in order to provide an addi­
tional shield for the exercise of a constitutional right, the Court has the 
authority to invalidate an act of Congress even if that act alone ade­
quately protects against actual violations of that right. That, however, 
is precisely the authority the Court refused to exercise in Bush and 
Chi/icky. In those cases, the Court found that Congress was in a better 
todial police questioning are somehow distinct from "ordinary" Fifth Amendment rights. See 
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda, Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth 
Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 MICH. L. REV. 941 (2001). The cases Schulhofer cites for the 
"ordinary" principle, however, illustrate only the special point that imposing a penalty on a 
person for exercising the Fifth Amendment is constitutionally forbidden. See Hoffman v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951) (criminal contempt); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 
614 (1965) ("[C]omment on the refusal to testify . . .  is a penalty imposed by courts for exer­
cising a constitutional privilege."); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (penalty of 
loss of public employment); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1968) (the "privi­
lege against self-incrimination does not tolerate the attempt . . .  to coerce a waiver . . .  on 
penalty of the loss of employment"); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 611 (1972) (striking 
down rule because it "imposed a penalty for petitioner's initial silence"); Lefkowitz v. 
Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 83 (1973) (viewing disqualification from public contracting as an imper­
missible "penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege" (internal quotation omitted)); 
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805-06 (1977) ("[G]overnment cannot penalize as­
sertion of the constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination by imposing sanc­
tions."); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 455-56 (1979) (explaining that the rule consid­
ered in Brooks v. Tennessee was found unconstitutional because it "imposed a penalty on the 
right to remain silent"); Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 301 (1981) (explaining that no ad­
verse-inference instruction must be given to jury because "the penalty" for not testifying 
"may be just as severe [as in Griffin] when . . .  the jury is left to roam at large with only its 
untutored instincts to guide it . . .  "). Since Schulhofer's cases reflect only a prohibition of 
penalizing the exercise of the privilege of silence, they provide no rational support for 
Schulhofer's notion that merely questioning a suspect in custody automatically violates the 
Fifth Amendment unless an elaborate set of protective procedures is followed. See generally 
JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH AND THE LAW 137-39 & n.151 (1996). 
Schulhofer further argues that Fifth Amendment exceptionalism is of recent origin, at­
tributable purely to the Tucker-Elstad-Quarles lines of cases which "drain[ed] Fifth 
Amendment compulsion of its distinctive content" by equating it with Fourteenth Amend­
ment voluntariness. See Schulhofer, supra, at 949-50. But Court precedent before Miranda 
specifically recognized the congruence of the voluntariness standard and the self­
incrimination standard in the specific context of custodial questioning. See Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (stating that voluntariness standard and Fifth Amendment stan­
dard for admission of confessions are "the same standard"). Schulhofer also claims that the 
fact that Fifth Amendment precedent condemns certain practices as "impermissibly compel­
ling per se" demonstrates that the voluntariness standard is "entirely foreign to the Court's 
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence . . .  " Schulhofer, supra, at 947-48. But per se prohibitions 
were recognized under the voluntariness standard as well. See, e.g. , Stein v. New York, 346 
U.S. 156, 182 (1953) (holding that where suspect is threatened with violence, there "is no 
need to weigh or measure its effects on the will of the individual," because such confessions 
are "too untrustworthy to be received as evidence of guilt"). It is therefore unsurprising to 
find the Court's cases routinely treating compulsion under the Fifth Amendment and invol­
untariness as the same standard in substance. See Portash, 440 U.S. at 458-59 (treating com­
pulsion in the Fifth Amendment sense as an interchangeable concept with coercion and in­
voluntariness); Garrity, 385 U.S. at 495-98 (same). 
Of course, as a final problem, Schulhofer's position would require repudiating numerous 
post-Miranda cases, such as Tucker, Quarles, and Elstad. Small wonder, then, that, although 
he advanced this position to the Court in Dickerson, see Brief for Amicus Curiae The 
American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Petitioner at 7-11 ,  Dickerson v. United States, 
120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525) (authored in part by Schulhofer), not a single Justice 
even nibbled on it. At least I got two votes! 
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position than the courts to evaluate the costs and benefits of differing 
approaches,46 and that the Court had "no legal basis that would allow 
[it] to revise [Congress's] decisions."47 The same is true with custodial 
questioning. It is not possible through any feasible set of rules to as­
sure that interrogations never become coercive. The only way to fore­
close that possibility completely is to prohibit custodial questioning al­
together, just as the only way to prevent any violations of defendants' 
rights at trial would be to prohibit all prosecutions. The Miranda 
Court declined to impose this prohibition, and with good reason. 
Because perfection is impossible, estimating the effectiveness of 
laws intended to decrease the number of constitutional violations, how 
many there are to be decreased, and the cost to other values that one 
preventive rule or another is likely to impose, are necessarily matters 
of judgment and degree. "Congressional competence at 'balancing 
governmental efficiency and the rights of [individuals],' . . .  is no more 
questionable" in the context of custodial interrogations than in other 
settings.48 Accordingly, there was no sounder basis for disturbing Con­
gress's judgment as to what measures are best designed to effectuate 
that balance fairly in this instance than there was in Bush or Chilicky. 
To the extent that Dickerson answers any of these concerns, it is 
through two, very briefly developed arguments that are misplaced as 
an answer to the constitutional common law approach. First, the Court 
notes that, "with respect to proceedings in state courts, our 'authority 
is limited to enforcing the commands · of the United States 
Constitution. ' "49 Of course, if the Court can "enforce" constitutional 
commands with nonconstitutional prophylactic rules, as cases like 
Tucker, Quarles, and Elstad squarely held, then this statement pro­
vides no basis for concluding that the Miranda rules are constitution­
ally required. Moreover, the proposition that the Court has some 
authority to impose on the States measures that are not strictly consti­
tutionally necessary, but are designed to assist in enforcing constitu­
tional rights, is hardly revolutionary. It is consistent with what the 
Miranda Court itself said on the subject. Whatever else is in dispute 
about the Miranda decision, it is clear that the Court believed its spe­
cific rule could be legislatively superceded by others. Nor is Miranda 
the only instance in which the Court has claimed this power. The 
Court has engaged in a similar task in several other areas.5° For exam-
46. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 387-90 (1 983). 
47. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 (1988). 
48. Chi/icky, 487 U.S. at 425 (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 389) (internal citation omitted); 
see also Palermo, 360 U.S. at 343, 353 n.11 (discovery rules for criminal defendants). 
49. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333 (quoting Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991)). 
50. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text (discussing Mapp, Bivens, and similar 
cases). 
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ple, the Court has applied the act of state doctrine to the states as a 
judicially created, nonconstitutional rule that is not compelled by the 
Constitutions 1 and subject to congressional modification.s2 Similarly, 
under the dormant commerce clause doctrine, Congress is free to vali­
date state actions that would otherwise be prohibited by the Court's 
decisions.s3 
Yet another example of the Court applying extraconstitutional 
rules to the states was discussed during oral argument in Dickerson, 
but did not find its way into the Court's opinion. The rule of 
Chapman v. California,s4 is a clear counter-example to Dickerson's 
claim that rules applied to the states may not be superseded legisla­
tively by Congress.ss Chapman involved a state constitution provision 
which established a standard for deciding reversible versus harmless 
error.s6 The Court held that federal law overrode the state standard, 
but was unclear about the basis for the rule it announced.s7 It is clear, 
however, that the Chapman standard is not mandated by the 
Constitution.s8 Indeed, as the Chapman opinion itself states, the re­
sponsibility, and presumably the authority, of the Court to fashion 
such a rule exists only "in the absence of appropriate congressional ac­
tion. "s9 A court-made rule, like that in Chapman, that overrides a state 
constitutional provision yet is subject to revision by Congress, can only 
be explained as federal common law.60 
Justice Scalia pursued this issue at oral argument, explaining to 
Solicitor General Waxman that: "In Chapman v. California, which was 
decided the term after Miranda and which also involved a procedural 
51. See e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964). 
52. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 180-81 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. de­
nied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968). For further discussion of the act of state analogy to Miranda, see 
Cassell, supra note 1, at 238-39. 
53. The doctrine furthers the constitutional "right to engage in interstate trade," Dennis 
v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 448 (1991) (internal quotations omitted), by invalidating state laws 
that unduly burden or interfere with such commerce. The Court's decisions in this area are 
certainly "constitutionally based" on the Commerce Clause, but Congress is free to modify 
them. See, e.g., Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174-75 (1985); 
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421, 436 (1856). 
54. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
55. The following discussion draws heavily on the amicus brief from the Criminal Justice 
Legal Foundation, which presented this argument to the Court. See Brief of Amicus Crimi­
nal Justice Legal Foundation, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-
5525). 
56. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 20 & n.3. 
57. See Daniel Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 2, 24-26 (1994). 
58. 386 U.S. at 24-26. 
59. 386 U.S. at 21 .  
60. Meltzer, supra note 57,  at 26 ("[T]he harmless error rule should be seen as constitu­
tional common law."). 
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rule, we said: 'We have no hesitation in saying that the right of these 
petitioners not to be punished for exercising their Fifth Amendment 
right is a Federal right which, in the absence of appropriate congres­
sional action, it is our responsibility to protect by fashioning the neces­
sary rule . '  "61 This statement demonstrates the Justices' awareness of 
the statement in Chapman about fashioning a constitutional rule, ap­
plicable to the states, that is nonetheless subject to congressional 
modification. Yet the Dickerson majority choose not to explain why it 
would not view Miranda, decided just one year before Chapman, in 
the same way. 
The only oth,er explanation the Court gave for concluding that 
Miranda was a constitutionally based rule was Miranda's application 
in habeas proceedings. In a footnote, the Court recounted the federal 
habeas statute, which makes relief available for claims that a person 
"is in custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the 
United States."62 The Court then asserted, in a single sentence, that 
" [s]ince the Miranda rule is clearly not based on federal law or trea­
ties, our decision allowing habeas review for Miranda claims obviously 
assumes that Miranda is of constitutional origin."63 The truth is that 
nothing could be less clear or obvious. The Court had never said any 
such thing in the prior habeas cases. Moreover, another straightfor­
ward inference was possible to explain Miranda's application on ha­
beas. Miranda could be viewed as part of the "law of the United 
States," which, for purposes of § 2254(a), includes not only federal 
statutes, but also decisional law designed to help effectuate the federal 
Constitution or statutes. The Court had taken a similar view of the 
same phrase used in a similar context in the federal question jurisdic­
tional statute64 and had attached such a construction to the words 
"laws of the several States" to include state court decisions in Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.65 This is the approach of not only Larry 
Yackle, a leading habeas commentator,66 but of the Department of 
Justice. In the 1993 case Withrow v. Williams,67 when a Miranda issue 
61. Tr. of Oral Argument at 14, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 
99-5525) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967) (emphasis added)). 
62. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333 n.3 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). 
63. 120 S. Ct. at 2333 n.3 (emphases added). 
64. See Nat'I Farmers Union Ins. Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 
850-51 (1985) (providing that federal common law as articulated in rules that are fashioned 
by court decisions constitutes "laws" as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1331). 
65. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
66. See LARRY w. YACKLE, POST CONVICTION REMEDIES § 97, at 371 (1981 & 1996 
Supp.) (concluding Miranda rules can be viewed as "federal 'law' which, under the [habeas] 
statute, may form the basis for habeas relief'). 
67. See Tr. Of Oral Argument at 15-16, Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) (No. 
91-1030). While the transcript of oral argument does not identify the justices who are 
speaking, I have listened to the tape and believe the justice is Justice Stevens. 
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was before the Court on habeas, the Deputy Solicitor General told the 
Court that Miranda could indeed be viewed as a "law" of the United 
States under the habeas statute.68 In Dickerson, however, the 
Department of Justice simply reversed its position,69 without even ac­
knowledging (much less explaining) the about face.70 Interestingly, 
during the oral argument in Withrow, at least one Justice appeared to 
agree with this position, going so far as to concur with the idea of con­
stitutional common law: 
QUESTION: Do you think that the exclusionary rule is a "law" of the 
United States that was involved in Stone? 
MR. ROBERTS: I think it is what's been described as constitutional 
common law. 
QUESTION: Yeah, I think so, too.71 
As this colloquy illustrates, the answers to such questions are, at a 
minimum, far from "clear" and "obvious." 
* * * * * 
In short, what the Court could have said in upholding § 3501 was 
this: In considering § 3501, Congress balanced the costs and benefits of 
a rule excluding all unwarned confessions against the costs and bene­
fits of allowing the trial court to decide on the facts of each case 
whether the suspect spoke voluntarily. It knew the obvious, namely, 
that a court is distinctly less likely to find an unwarned statement to 
have been voluntary, but that sometimes the court would decide that 
other circumstances proved the statement's voluntary character. It 
also knew that there would be some cases where allowing the jury to 
hear that statement would prove the difference between a successful 
and unsuccessful prosecution of a dangerous criminal. Finally, it un­
derstood the damage to public confidence in the criminal justice sys­
tem, not to mention the risk to public safety, that results when the jury 
reaches the wrong result because it is not allowed to hear highly pro­
bative evidence. Weighing all these considerations, Congress con­
cluded that the cost of slightly less police deterrence - that is, mar­
ginally diminished deterrence resulting from the significant risk (as 
opposed to the certainty) of excluding an unwarned confession - was 
68. Tr. of Oral Argument at 14-15, Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) (No. 91-
1030). 
69. See Brief of the United States at 24, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 
(2000) (No. 99-5525). 
70. Curiously, in Withrow, the prisoner was represented by Seth Waxman. When Mr. 
Waxman became Solicitor General, he apparently directed the Department to reverse, with­
out explanation, its earlier position. 
71. Tr. of Oral Argument at 18, Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) (No. 91-1030) 
(quotation marks inserted around "law"). 
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outweighed by the benefits of admitting such a confession, so long as it 
is voluntary. Because Congress's modification of Miranda's extracon­
stitutional and overprotective exclusionary rule continues to forbid in 
all instances the government's use of involuntary statements, it fully 
affords defendants their rights under the Fifth Amendment, and thus 
is constitutionally sound. 
II. THEPATHNOT TAKEN: § 3501 ASAN A DEQUATE A LTERNATIVE 
TO MIRANDA 
The second way Dickerson could have been resolved hinges on the 
issue of alternatives to Miranda. The Miranda Court itself invited -
indeed "encouraged" - Congress and the states to craft alternative 
approaches to the Miranda rules.72 The Miranda Court promised that 
"[ o ]ur decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which 
will handicap sound efforts at reform."73 This was one reason that 
Congress in 1968 chose to adopt § 3501.74 
Section 3501 creates far stronger incentives for police officers to 
deliver Miranda-type warnings than existed before 1966. The press 
and academic commentators have written about Dickerson as though 
the issue were the "overruling" of Miranda or "the end of Miranda 
warnings." By doing so, they overlook an important and obvious fea­
ture of § 3501, namely that all of the Miranda warnings remain part of 
the voluntariness determination. The truth is that the warnings them­
selves were never at stake in Dickerson. 
Police officers would have generally continued to give Miranda 
warnings if the Fourth Circuit had been affirmed and if § 3501 had 
been upheld. Section 3501 directs the courts to consider the following 
when making voluntariness determinations: 
The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into 
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confes­
sion, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of 
the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and be­
fore arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the of­
fense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time 
of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised 
or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any 
such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such de­
fendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assis­
tance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the 
assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.75 
72. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
73. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
74. See S.REP No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N 2112. 
75. 18 u.s.c. § 3501(b) (1994). 
March 2001] Supreme Court's Failures in Dickerson 913 
The prominence that Miranda warnings enjoyed under § 3501 means 
that, if the Court had upheld the statute, federal law enforcement offi­
cers would almost certainly have continued to give them. They would 
have done so because it would assist in obtaining a favorable ruling on 
the admissibility of a statement a trial.76 
This was not merely my view. The Department of Justice specifi­
cally stated in its brief in Dickerson that federal agents would continue 
to deliver Miranda warnings.77 Indeed, it is a little discussed fact that 
federal agents gave Miranda warnings even before they were required 
to do so by the Miranda opinion.78 Their doing so provides a real­
world confirmation of the Fourth Circuit's view that "nothing [in § 
3501] provides those in law enforcement with an incentive to stop 
giving the now familiar Miranda warnings."79 
Section 350l's encouragement to agents to give Miranda warnings 
might alone have been viewed as creating a viable alternative to 
Miranda.80 But § 3501 cannot be assessed in splendid isolation.81 Since 
1966, Congress and the courts have greatly expanded the civil, crimi­
nal, and administrative penalties against federal officers who coerce 
suspects. For example, in 1966, it was as a practical matter impossible 
for a suspect to sue a federal officer who coerced a confession. That 
changed in 1971, with Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, which recog­
nized a federal civil rights suit against individual federal agents for 
violations of constitutional rights.82 Bolstering the Bivens suits against 
individual agents, Congress in 1974 passed amendments to the Federal 
Tort Claims Act. These amendments waived sovereign immunity for 
suits against the federal government arising out of acts or omissions by 
76. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984) (noting that Mirandized 
statements rarely found involuntary), quoted with approval in Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336; 
see also Welsh S. White, Miranda's Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1219 (2001) (noting that a survey of cases suggests that successful chal­
lenges to Mirandized confessions are rare). 
77. See Brief of Amicus Dep't of Justice, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 
(2000) (No. 99-5525). 
78. See infra note 174 (discussing FBI practice). United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 66 
(4th Cir. 1999). 
79. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 66 (4th Cir. 1999). 
80. Section 3501 also extended additional protections to suspects in at least one other 
way. See Cassell, supra note 1, at 243 (noting § 3501's requirement that courts consider the 
suspect's awareness of the nature of the charges against him, a requirement that extends fur­
ther than Miranda doctrine found in Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987)). 
81. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. 
L REV. 1479, 1483-1538 (1987) (courts should consider entire legal landscape in construing 
statutes). 
Several critiques of the constitutionality of § 3501 appear to suffer from the problem of 
analyzing the statute alone without considering the supplemental devices bolstering § 3501. 
See, e.g., Kamisar, Congress, supra note 13 (discussing only § 3501); Klein, supra note 7, at 
1057; Strauss, supra note 16, at 969. 
82. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text. 
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federal law enforcement agents involving "assault, battery, false im­
prisonment, abuse of process" and the like.83 In addition to civil suits, 
the federal government now has in place a much more developed sys­
tem of criminal and administrative penalties against its officers who 
coerce suspects into confession. For example, the Civil Rights Division 
of the Department of Justice now routinely investigates allegations of 
police brutality during interrogation.84 
My amicus brief advanced this position, explaining why it provided 
greater protection against truly coerced confessions than the Miranda 
framework.85 The Court responded to this issue in five sentences. The 
five sentences (with numbers inserted for ease of reference) are: 
[1] We agree with the amicus' contention that there are more remedies 
available for abusive police conduct than there were at the time Miranda 
was decided (citing cases). [2] But we do not agree that these additional 
measures supplement section 3501 's protections sufficiently to meet the 
constitutional minimum. [3] Miranda requires procedures that will warn 
a suspect in custody of his right to remain silent and which will assure the 
suspect that the exercise of that right will be honored. [4] As discussed 
above, section 3501 explicitly eschews a requirement of pre-interrogation 
warnings in favor of an approach that looks to the administration of such 
warnings as only one factor in determining the voluntariness of a sus­
pect's confessions. [5] The additional remedies cited by amicus do not, in 
our view, render them, together with section 3501, an adequate substitute 
for the warnings required by Miranda.86 
These five sentences exemplify the "nine headed Caesar" that Justice 
Scalia decried. The first sentence describes the position I advanced. 
The second sentence says that my position was rejected. The third and 
fourth sentences briefly describe Miranda and § 3501, and the fifth 
sentence repeats the conclusion that my argument is rejected - that 
Caesar has given a "thumbs down" to my position. But why the 
thumbs down? The Court, after all, had relied on similar remedies in 
refusing to extend the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to immi­
gration proceedings in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza.87 Yet here the Court 
offers no explanation for refusing to find the alternative remedies 
adequate. 
An interesting omission from this part of the opinion is any refer­
ence to Miranda's requirement that any alternative be shown to be "at 
83. 28 u.s.c. § 2680(h) (1994). 
84. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.50 (1994) (establishing Justice Department's Civil Rights Division). 
85. See Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus at 28-40, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. 
Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525). Other commentators have also raised this issue. See, e.g., 
Harold J. Krent, The Supreme Court as an Enforcement Agency, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1 149, 1184-87, 1203-04 (1998). 
86. 120 S. Ct. at 2335. 
87. 468 U.S. 1032, 1044-45 (1984). 
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least as effective [as Miranda] in apprising accused persons of their 
right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise 
it."88 Perhaps the Dickerson Court omitted it because, as a matter of 
precedent, the "equally effective" language obviously is not necessary 
to Miranda's holding.89 Moreover, the language could not be recon­
ciled with the Court's later descriptions of Miranda. Miranda's various 
statements about the need for equally effective alternatives all occur 
in those parts of the opinion where the Court seems to say that any 
statement police obtain without explaining to the defendant his rights 
is necessarily compelled. But as noted earlier,w cases such as Quarles 
make clear that those portions of Miranda cannot be read that way. In 
Quarles and similar cases, suspects' statements were found admissible 
despite having been obtained without either compliance with Miranda 
or any "equally effective" alternative. Once those portions of Miranda 
are properly understood, the force of the "equally effective" dicta dis­
appears. The Court can insist on warnings or their equivalents only if 
the admission of a statement obtained without these measures would 
violate the Constitution. Dickerson, as Justice Scalia pointed out, 
makes no such assertion.91 Nor could any such assertion be reconciled 
with Quarles and related cases. The surviving justification for a 
"warnings or equivalent" requirement is instead to help prevent future 
Fifth Amendment violations. This is the way that Dickerson describes 
Miranda. Dickerson explains that the old voluntariness test "raised a 
risk of overlooking an involuntary custodial confession, a risk that the 
Court found unacceptably great when the confession is offered in the 
case in chief to prove guilt."92 In briefly mentioning the "equally effec­
tive" language in an earlier part of the opinion, the Court "clarified" 
that it means a "procedure that is effective in securing Fifth 
Amendment rights."93 If this is true, however, other prophylactic 
measures that provide equivalent protection against the use of actually 
compelled statements are constitutionally sufficient even if they do not 
provide equivalent assurance that the suspect was informed of his 
rights so long as they sufficiently reduce the "risk" of a violation and 
88. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
89. Cf Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) ("Some comments in the Miranda 
opinion can indeed be read as indicating a bar to use of an uncounseled statement for any 
purpose, but discussion of that issue was not at all necessary to the Court's holding and can­
not be regarded as controlling."). 
90. See supra notes 1 1-13 and accompanying text. 
91. 120 S. Ct. at 2337-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
92. 120 S. Ct. at 2335 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
93. 120 S. Ct. at 2334 n.6 (emphasis added). 
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"secure" the underlying Fifth Amendment right to be free from giving 
an involuntary statement.94 
* * * * * 
In short, what the Court could have said in upholding § 3501 was 
this: Miranda itself invited Congress and the states to adopt reason­
able alternative procedures for protecting suspects during custodial in­
terrogation. Section 3501, when considered against the backdrop of 
other statutory and judiciary protections against police coercion, pro­
vides sufficient protection to comply with the Constitution. 
III. SECTION 3501 AS A MODIFICATION OF MIRANDA'S 
IRREBUTI ABLE PRESUMPTION 
So far, this Article has focused on unresolved inconsistencies be­
tween Dickerson and the rest of Miranda doctrine. But Dickerson's 
doctrinal problems extend into other areas as well. Perhaps the most 
glaring deficiency is the latitude that the Court has given itself in 
promulgating constitutional "rules" as opposed to the constraints it 
has imposed on Congress, an ostensibly co-equal branch of govern­
ment. In particular, in its landmark 1997 decision, City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 95 the Court demarcated clear limits on the power of Congress 
to promulgate prophylactic rules protecting constitutional rights. Yet 
in Dickerson, the Court refused to abide by the same rules. 
Here it useful to recall the developments leading up to the Boerne 
decision.96 The Supreme Court had decided in Employment Division v. 
Smith97 that government decisions burdening religious practices need 
only survive a rational basis test, not the more demanding compelling 
interest test. Under rational basis scrutiny, the Court upheld Oregon's 
law prohibiting the use of peyote in Native American religious cere­
monies. Congress then held extensive hearings on the subject, con­
cluding that the rational basis test inadequately protected First 
Amendment free exercise rights. At the behest of Senators Orrin 
94. Cf Smith v. Robbins, 120 S. Ct. 746, 759 (2000) (upholding against constitutional 
challenge an alternative to Anders procedure that provided protection for constitutional 
right at issue at least as good as contained in Anders). Bolstering this point is the 
congressional judgment that § 3501 would effectively secure suspects' rights, a point pursued 
at greater length in Part I I I ,  infra. Cf Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 ( 1983); Schweiker v. 
Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1987) (deferring to congressional judgments on effectiveness issues). 
Also, during the sixteen months § 3501 was in effect in the Fourth Circuit, it appeared that, 
in practice, § 3501 has indeed been at least as effective as the Miranda regime at protecting 
Fifth Amendment rights. 
95. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
96. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom 
and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249 (1995). 
97. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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Hatch and Ted Kennedy, among others, Congress passed the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") requiring all state and 
federal laws burdening religion to satisfy the compelling interest test. 
In City of Boerne, the Supreme Court struck down RFRA as un­
constitutional. The Court concluded that, even though Congress has 
the power to "enforce" constitutional rights under Section 5 of the 
14th Amendment, Congress lacked the power to mandate the compel­
ling interest test across the states for all laws. The Court was con­
cerned that Congress might use its "enforcement" power effectively to 
rewrite the Constitution. To prevent such rewriting under the guise of 
remediation, the Court required that there be "congruence and pro­
portionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the 
means adopted to that end." RFRA, the Court concluded, could not 
survive that test because it effectively changed the First Amendment 
standard, dictating a new constitutional rule that states were required 
to follow.98 
With those limits on Congress in mind, it may be useful to employ 
a thought experiment to see how the Boerne limitations might apply in 
the Miranda context. Imagine for a moment that the Supreme Court 
had never adopted the Miranda procedures. Congress, however, de­
cided to step in and require those procedures. Assume that Congress 
passed a federal statute requiring state police officers to recite the 
Miranda warnings and - this is the most important part - mandated 
that state courts could not admit into evidence any confession ob­
tained without these warnings. Under City of Boerne, such a sweeping 
enactment would be beyond the powers of Congress. The enactment 
would effectively "rewrite" the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of in­
voluntary statements and require a vast reworking of state police op­
erations around the country. The enactment would make "a substan­
tive change in constitutional protections."99 It is hard to see how such a 
change would be a "congruent and proportionate"100 enforcement de­
vice for protecting Fifth Amendment rights. 
The obvious application of this exercise is to consider how 
Boerne's limitations on Congress would apply to the Court's decision 
in Miranda. Miranda goes beyond the Fifth Amendment in requiring 
the suppression of voluntary but unwarned confessions, like the con­
fession given by Dickerson. Miranda's rules are out of proportion be­
cause they "prohibit . . .  substantially more" police practices than 
would "likely be held unconstitutional under the applicable" Fifth 
Amendment standard.101 To be sure, confessions obtained without 
98. For trenchant criticism of Boerne, see Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and 
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111  HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997). 
99. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. 
100. Id. at 520. See Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 644-50 (2000). 
101. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 647. 
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complying with Miranda's procedures may sometimes be involuntary. 
But there is little reason to believe that this will be true all the time or 
even most of the time. As Justice O'Connor observed a few years be­
fore Dickerson: 
In case after case, the courts are asked . . . to decide purely technical 
Miranda questions that contain not even a hint of police overreaching. 
And in case after case, no voluntariness issue is raised, primarily because 
none exists. Whether the suspect was in "custody, " whether or not there 
was "interrogation," whether warnings were given or were adequate, 
whether the defendant's equivocal statement constituted an invocation of 
rights, whether waiver was knowing and intelligent - this is the stuff that 
Miranda claims are made of. While these questions create litigable issues 
under Miranda, they generally do not indicate the existence of coer­
cion . . .  sufficient to establish involuntariness. 102 
In Dickerson, for example, the district court found Dickerson's un­
warned statements voluntary under the Fifth Amendment. The volun­
tariness of the statements in this case is typical of Miranda violations 
that have reached the Court over the years.103 
Miranda's lack of proportionality is shown not only by its over­
broad reach in particular cases, but also by its unlimited application. 
Miranda's automatic exclusionary rule applies to every episode of cus­
todial questioning conducted by every level of government, federal, 
state, and local, numbering in the hundreds of thousands each year. It 
is not limited to a particular period of time or to jurisdictions with a 
particular history of abuse. It contains no mechanism for a jurisdiction 
to extricate itself by showing that it has had a long history of compli­
ance with the Self-Incrimination Clause.104 The "indiscriminate scope" 
of the rules is itself strong evidence that they are disproportionate.105 
The Court has also looked to the scope of the problem Congress is 
addressing when considering the breadth of prophylactic rules. The 
scope of the problem to which Miranda was responding remains un­
clear, but the evidence of epidemic police abuse was, and is, quite lim­
ited. Miranda did refer to "anecdotal evidence" concerning abusive 
102. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 709-10 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (cita­
tions omitted) (collecting numerous illustrations). 
103. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 592 A.2d 985, 986 n.2 (D.C. 1991) (statement spe­
cifically found to be voluntary below), cert. granted, 504 U.S. 908 (1992) (No. 91-1521) and 
cert. dismissed, 507 U.S. 545 (1993); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 315 (1985) ("It is . . .  be­
yond dispute that respondent's earlier [un-Mirandized] remark was voluntary."); Oregon v. 
Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975) ("There is no evidence or suggestion that Hass' statements to 
[police] . . .  were involuntary or coerced."); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445 (1974) 
("the interrogation in this case involved no compulsion sufficient to breach the right against 
compulsory self-incrimination"). 
104. Cf Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533 (commenting favorably on the presence of such devices 
as a means of assuring proportionality). 
105. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 650. 
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police interrogation,106 which no doubt was a problem in exceptional 
cases before Miranda - just as it remains a problem in some excep­
tional cases today. But the bulk of the justification in the opinion came 
from an examination of "police manuals and texts" on techniques for 
questioning suspects.107 The difficulties with this material as evidence 
of pervasive coercion in custodial interrogations are legion.108 In fact, 
the Miranda majority acknowledged that it had little idea about typi­
cal practices. 109 Moreover, while the tactics in the police manuals were 
offered as evidence of compulsion, the Miranda Court concluded only 
that the tactics created the "potentiality for compulsion."110 Thus, the 
opinion in effect admits its failure to demonstrate that the techniques 
and circumstances it characterized as giving rise to potential compul­
sion pervasively resulted in actual compulsion. 1 1 1  Nor is that particu­
larly surprising, for it is clear that the Miranda Court's true concern 
was with the potentially coercive circumstances themselves, not with 
actual compulsion - just as it is clear that, in passing RFRA, " [the 
103d] Congress's concern was with the incidental burdens imposed" 
on religion by neutral laws, not with deliberate persecution. 1 12 
Dickerson rests on an understanding of the Court's power that ex­
tends it far beyond Congress's. The Court is entitled, of course, to the 
last word in interpreting the Constitution in the Marbury v. Madison 
sense. But questions of "constitutional rules" are of a different order. 
As Justice Scalia's dissent pointedly notes, Dickerson in no way 
equates a violation of Miranda's "constitutional rule" with a violation 
106. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1966). Interestingly, Miranda did not 
cite any contemporary cases in which the police had extracted a confession through threat­
ened force. For this point, it relied on such dated information as the Wickersham Report in 
1931 and a few Supreme Court cases in the 1940s and early 1950s. 384 U.S. at 445-46. 
Miranda went on to conclude that police coercion "is not, unfortunately, relegated to the 
past or to any part of the country," id. at 446, resting this assertion on a few additional iso­
lated and dated reports. Id. The Court conceded, however, that "[t]he examples given above 
are undoubtedly the exception now." Id. at 447. 
107. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448. 
108. See generally id. at 532-33 (White, J., dissenting). 
109. Id. at 448. 
1 10. Id. at 457. 
1 1 1. Id. at 645. It is also noteworthy that both the executive and legislative branches 
reached their own conclusions, contemporaneously with Miranda, that coercion as tradition­
ally understood was not pervasive in custodial interrogations. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE 
SOCIETY 93 (1967) (stating, based on pre-Miranda data, that "today the third degree is al­
most nonexistent"); S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 21 12, 2134 
(reviewing congressional testimony from expert witnesses on lack of coercive techniques and 
concluding Miranda's contrary findings were based on an "overreact(ion] to defense claims 
that police brutality is widespread"); see generally Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: 
An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 387, 473-78 (1996) (hereinafter Cassell, So­
cial Costs] (collecting evidence on limited number of involuntary confessions in 1966). 
1 12. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531-32. 
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of the Constitution. 1 13 Instead, Dickerson describes Miranda as reject­
ing the old, totality-of-the-circumstances voluntariness test because it 
"raised a risk of overlooking an involuntary custodial confession, a 
risk that the Court found unacceptably great when the confession is 
offered in the case in chief to prove guilt." 1 14 But this, of course, was 
precisely the type of protection Congress sought to extend to First 
Amendment freedoms in City of Boerne.115 In refusing to apply a 
Boerne analysis to its own rule, the Court is asserting greater authority 
to craft such protective devices than Congress possesses. Yet, if any­
thing, congressional power in this area should be broader than judicial 
power. The Constitution explicitly confers on Congress the power to 
"enforce" constitutional rights in Section 5 of the 14th Amendment 
and the power to adopt "necessary and proper" legislation in Article I, 
Section 8. In contrast, any power that the Constitution confers on the 
Court to enforce rights is purely an inferential one, presumably no 
greater than the power possessed by Congress, and perhaps even 
lesser. 1 16 
Dickerson's rigid adherence to rules that lack congruence and pro­
portionality is particularly suspect in light of a modest modification 
that was proposed in Dickerson. The lack of congruence and propor­
tionality between Miranda's rules and Fifth Amendment violations 
could have been cured by changing Miranda's irrebuttable presump­
tion to a rebuttable one. Under Miranda doctrine, the "[f]ailure to 
administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion" 
which is "irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecution's case in 
chief." 1 17 In other contexts, such rigid presumptions are typically justi­
fied on the ground that they "avoid the costs of excessive inquiry 
where a per se rule will achieve the correct result in almost all 
cases."1 18 The Miranda presumption, however, operates to achieve in­
correct results in many cases. 
1 13. 120 S. Ct. at 3227 (Scalia, J ., dissenting); see also discussion at supra note 91 and 
accompanying text. 
1 14. 120 S. Ct. at 2335 (internal citation omitted). 
115. See S. Rep. No. 103-1 1 1 ,  at 8 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1897 
("By lowering the level of constitutional protection for religious practices, [Smith] has cre­
ated a climate in which the free exercise of religion is jeopardized."). 
1 16. Compare Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649-50 (1966) (upholding congres­
sional ban on literacy tests), with Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 
45, 51-54 (1959) (refusing to strike down literacy tests under Court's authority to enforce the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
1 17. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985). 
1 18. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 737 (1991). Per se rules are also sometimes 
justified on the grounds that exceptions are not sufficiently "important to justify the time 
and expense necessary to identify them." Id. (internal citation omitted). This rationale has 
no application when considering § 3501. Congress has determined to the contrary that the 
judiciary should devote such additional energy as may be needed (if any) to making accurate 
(rather than presumptive) voluntariness determinations in federal criminal cases. Moreover, 
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The Court has acknowledged that " [p]er se rules should not be ap­
plied . . .  in situations where the generalization is incorrect as an em­
pirical matter; the justification for a conclusive presumption disap­
pears when application of the presumption will not reach the correct 
result most of the time."1 19 Under Boerne, the irrebuttable presump­
tion creates a jarring lack of "congruence and proportionality."  In­
deed, to apply an irrebuttable presumption is effectively to change the 
Fifth Amendment's compulsion standard to a new, warnings-and­
waiver standard, thus "alter[ing] the meaning" of the Fifth 
Amendment120 and "substantively redefin[ing] the State's legal obliga­
tions" during custodial interrogation.121 
The simple way to avoid flagrant inconsistency with the Boerne 
principle would have been for the Court to have modified Miranda so 
that it operated as a rebuttable presumption - that is, confessions 
taken without following the Miranda procedures would have been 
presumed involuntary unless the state could prove otherwise. Justice 
Clark suggested this approach in his dissent in Miranda as an interme­
diate position between the majority and the other dissenters. He pro­
posed that " [i]n the absence of warnings, the burden would be on the 
State to prove . . .  that in the totality of the circumstances, including 
the failure to give the necessary warnings, the confession was clearly 
voluntary."122 
This allocation of burdens, superimposed on § 3501 (which can 
easily be read in this fashion123), would have brought § 350l's prophy­
lactic effect even closer to that of Miranda's exclusionary rule by ex­
plicitly conferring a preferred status to confessions obtained in com­
pliance with Miranda. At the same time, it would have eliminated the 
single feature of Miranda's irrebuttable presumption most objection­
able under Boerne: the imposition of a standard for the admissibility 
of custodial confessions more stringent than the constitutional volun­
tariness standard, and the attendant automatic exclusion of many 
statements that in fact comply with the constitutional standard. In con-
because confessions are "essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and 
punishing those who violate the law," Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986), individu­
alized voluntariness determinations would appear to be time well spent. 
1 19. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 737. 
120. Cf Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 ("Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free 
Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause."). 
121. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 648 (2000). See generally ]. GRANO, 
supra note 45, at 198 (arguing that Miranda "substituted for the constitutional rule a new 
substantive rule of its own making"). · 
122. 384 U.S. at 503 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
123. Section 3501(a) provides that .a confession "shall be admissible in evidence if it is 
voluntarily given" (emphasis added), implying that the presumption is against admissibility 
unless and until voluntariness is established. The Court, of course, has a duty to read con­
gressional enactments so as to comply with the Constitution. 
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trast, a rebuttable presumption would have been a proportionate re­
sponse to the various risks identified by the Miranda Court. It would 
also have preserved the assistance the Miranda factors provide to the 
courts in structuring the voluntariness inquiry, while ending the irra­
tional mechanical application of those factors to exclude unwarned 
confessions, even when the confession is unquestionably voluntary. 
In Illinois v. Gates,124 the Court performed a similar modification to 
a test it previously suggested but came to regard as overly rigid. In 
Gates, the Court rejected the two-pronged "Spinelli-Aguilar" test for 
determining probable cause in favor of a totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach. Raising a concern that applies equally to the Miranda doc­
trine, the Court explained that "the 'two-pronged test' has encouraged 
an excessively technical dissection of informants' tips, with undue at­
tention being focused on isolated issues that cannot sensibly be di­
vorced from the other facts."125 Yet, in restoring the totality-of-the­
circumstances approach, the Court emphasized that the Spinelli­
Aguilar factors remained "highly relevant" in determining probable 
cause,126 and later cases have examined them.127 Thus, just as the 
Spinelli-Aguilar factors now serve "not as inflexible, independent re­
quirements applicable in every case," but rather as "guides to a magis­
trate's determination of probable cause,"128 so too the Miranda factors 
would have guided determination of voluntariness issues. 
Making the Miranda presumption rebuttable would not have re­
turned the law to its pre-Miranda state. When Miranda was decided, 
the constitutional assignment of the burden for establishing voluntari­
ness was unclear.129 A rebuttable Miranda presumption could have 
been crafted that would place the burden on the government to estab­
lish voluntariness while making delivery of Miranda warnings an im­
portant part of the calculus. 
The Dickerson majority's response to this possibility was aston­
ishing. The idea of viewing Miranda as a rebuttable presumption was 
presented to the Court not only in my brief on behalf of the Fourth 
124. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
125. Id. at 234-35 (footnote omitted). 
126. Id. at 230. 
127. See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990). 
128. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 n.6. 
129. See Developments in the Law - Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 1 069-70 
(1966) (noting majority rule that prosecution proves voluntariness and minority rule that 
defendant proves involuntariness). After Miranda, the issue has been clarified, but has not 
been definitively resolved. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972), definitely suggests that 
the prosecution must prove voluntariness. See generally 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 10.3(c) at 429 (2d ed. 1999) (noting Lego "raises serious doubts" 
about placing burden on defendant to prove involuntariness). But some states continue to 
place the burden on the defendant to show involuntariness. See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 742 
So.2d 466, 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
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Circuit, but was also suggested in separate briefs filed by the United 
States House of Representatives, by a number of United States 
Senators, and nineteen states.130 The majority said only - in a single 
sentence in a concluding footnote - that it would not consider the 
various suggestions that had been advanced by the various amici be­
cause of "the procedural posture of this case."131 The Court's reason­
ing here is quite strained. In its concluding footnote, the Court cites 
three cases standing for the proposition that the Court generally will 
not reach arguments that have not "been urged by either party in this 
Court."132 But, in Dickerson, both of the parties were attacking the de­
cision below - the very reason that various amici organizations were 
compelled to file briefs defending the decision. In those circumstances, 
refusing to consider the amici's arguments because they were not pre­
sented by the parties effectively allowed a stipulated outcome, the 
very thing that the Court has long held impermissible.133 With a case in 
this posture, it also meant that the Court departed from the normal 
rule that respondents (in this case, amicus respondents) could raise 
any argument in support of the judgment below.134 Instead, on the 
Court's view, only the Fourth Circuit's arguments could be considered 
as a basis for sustaining § 3501, even though the Court's ruling would 
preclude any other supportive arguments from ever being raised. 
In Dickerson, with institutional representatives from Congress and 
a significant number of states asking for clarification on an important 
point of Miranda, it is hard to understand why the Court would not 
say something about the issue.135 Moreover, the Court reached the 
130. Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United 
States House of Representatives in Support of Affirmance at 15-16, Dickerson v. United 
States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525); Brief for the States of South Carolina et al. as 
Amici Curiae Urging Affirmance at 5-16, Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525); 
Brief of Amicus Curiae of Senators Orrin G. Hatch et al. Urging Affirmance at 7-9, 
Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525). 
131. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336-37 n.8. 
132. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 532 n.13 (1979) (emphasis added); see also United 
Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2 (1981) (declining to reach issue "since it 
was not raised by either of the parties here or below"); Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 
361, 370 (1960) (declining to reach argument that "has never been advanced by petitioners in 
this case"). 
133. See Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 259 (1942) ("[T]he proper administration 
of the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of the parties."). 
134. The Court allows greater freedom in responding to a question presented, because a 
respondent may, without cross-petitioning, "urge any grounds which would lend support to 
the judgment below," Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419 (1977), 
including "grounds different from those upon which the court below rested its judgment." 
McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generate Transatlantique, 309 U.S. 430, 434 (1940). 
135. Presumably the House of Representatives could have intervened in Dickerson to 
defend the statute, an action which would seem to have given it "party" status for purpose of 
having its arguments considered. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); see gener­
ally, Note, Executive Discretion and the Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92 YALE L.J. 970 
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larger issue of whether Miranda should be overruled in its entirety -
an issue not squarely presented in any amicus brief. It is difficult to 
understand why the Court would reach, on its own initiative, this 
broader question of whether to overrule Miranda, but not the nar­
rower question subsumed within it of whether to modify one particu­
lar facet of Miranda. 
* * * * * 
In short, what the Court could have said in upholding § 3501 was 
this: The power to promulgate prophylactic rules protecting constitu­
tional rights is not unlimited. The Court, no less than Congress, is 
bound by the principle of City of Boerne that prophylactic rules must 
be "congruent and proportionate" to the underlying constitutional 
right. To make Miranda's procedures congruent and proportionate to 
the Fifth Amendment, the failure to follow the procedures in obtain­
ing a confession will raise a presumption of involuntariness, a pre­
sumption that can be rebutted by appropriate evidence of voluntari­
ness. 
IV. SECTI ON 3501 AS REFLE C TI NG CONG RESSI ONAL F A CTFI NDI NG 
ON MIRANDA'S HA RM 
This Article has thus far sketched three alternative resolutions of 
the Dickerson case, resolutions that would have largely reconciled the 
Court's varying pronouncements on Miranda doctrine without re­
quiring the Court to abandon the Miranda framework. But, because 
Dickerson itself ultimately reached the broader question of whether to 
retain Miranda, it is appropriate for this Article to say a few words 
about the stare decisis issue. On this question, too, Dickerson jarringly 
departed from other Court holdings. 
A. Failing to Consider Miranda's Costs 
Stare decisis requires a consideration of the arguments for and 
against retaining a legal rule, with the balance tipped from the start in 
favor of retention.136 When considering whether to modify other 
precedents, the Court has routinely assessed cost as part of the in­
quiry. 137 In the Miranda context, a critical issue would be the cost of 
(1983). It truly elevates form over substance to refuse to consider the arguments by the 
House because they were instead presented in the form of an amicus brief. 
136. I should emphasize that I in no way question stare decisis doctrine. Cf Gary 
Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 23 (1994); 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the 
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000). 
137. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
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the decision, measured in terms of its harms to law enforcement. In­
deed, the legitimacy of inquiring into cost can be traced to Miranda 
itself, where the Court promised that its decision was "not intended to 
hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating 
crime."138 In later rulings, too, the Court has described Miranda as "a 
carefully crafted balance designed to fully protect both the defendants' 
and society's interests,"139 further underscoring the need to consider 
Miranda's effect on prosecution. 
This question of Miranda's costs is a purely empirical one, requir­
ing calculation of how many dangerous criminals go free as a result of 
the Miranda rules. In our system of government, Congress is the 
branch charged with reviewing such issues. As the Court has acknowl­
edged, Congress has superior fact-finding powers because it is not 
"bound by the parties' submissions; rather, it can conduct hearings, 
canvass constituents, and obtain information from a broad range of 
sources." 14° Congress "is far better equipped than the judiciary to 
amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative 
questions."141 Academic commentators have also recognized 
Congress's comparative advantage. 142 
Because of Congress's comparative advantage in assembling in­
formation, the Court has routinely given great weight to congressional 
factual findings in evaluating the constitutionality of federal statutes. 
A prime illustration comes from United States v. Morrison,143 decided 
just five weeks before Dickerson. There, the Court invalidated the 
civil suits provision in the Violence Against Women Act (VA WA) on 
grounds that they exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce 
Clause. Both the five justices in the majority and the four justices in 
dissent prominently discussed the existence and effect of congressional 
findings on the effect of violence against women on interstate com­
merce. The majority acknowledged, and did not question, the congres­
sional finding "regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated 
violence has on victims and their families. "144 The dissent asserted that 
1 38. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477. 
139. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n.4 (1986). 
140. Michael Edmund O'Neill, Undoing Miranda, 2000 BYU L. REV. 185, 281 [herein­
after O'Neill, Undoing]; see also Michael Edmund O'Neill, Miranda Remediated, 3 
GREENBAG 149 (2000) [hereinafter O'Neill, Remediated] . 
141. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (quoting Turner 
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (1944); accord Walters v. Nat'! Ass'n of 
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 331 n.12 (1985). 
142. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 7, at 1066-68 (2001) (taking this view and collecting sup­
porting citations). 
143. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000). 
144. Id. at 1752. Nonetheless, for the majority these findings could not be given decisive 
weight on the ultimate question of effect on interstate commerce because "they rely so 
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"[t]he business of the courts is to review the congressional assessment, 
not for soundness but simply for the rationality of concluding that a 
jurisdictional basis exists in fact."145 
The same kind of findings that confronted the Court in Morrison 
existed in Dickerson. As ably recounted in Professor Michael O'Neil's 
recent article,146 the Senate Judiciary Committee held a series of 
hearings on how the Miranda rules were affecting day-to-day law en­
forcement. The Committee ultimately concluded that the "rigid and 
inflexible requirements" established in Miranda were "unreasonable, 
unrealistic, and extremely harmful to law enforcement."147 The 
Committee cited various studies demonstrating Miranda's harmful ef­
fect on prosecuting crimes.148 These conclusions impelled Congress to 
pass § 3501. 
Perhaps one might argue that the Congressional factfinding proc­
ess was flawed in various ways. For example, Professor Yale 
Kamisar's interesting and extended analysis of the "tone" of the leg­
islative process leads him to believe that Congress acted without care­
ful deliberations.149 Whatever the merits of Kamisar's view, it is hard 
to see how the quality of the congressional debate has a bearing on the 
weight to be given to the findings. Within our scheme of separated 
powers, the Court has no role in kibitzing on the way in which 
Congress reaches its decisions. 150 Moreover, Kamisar's review focuses 
primarily, if not exclusively, on Congress's legal determinations about 
the constitutionality of § 3501 - not Congress's factual determinations 
about the underlying harm to law enforcement.15 1 Because of his focus 
on jurisprudential issues, Kamisar does not appear to dispute that, in 
1968, Congress had ample evidence from police administrators and 
prosecutors that Miranda was hampering their efforts to bring danger­
ous criminals to book. 152 Kamisar's article does not substantively dis-
heavily on a method of reasoning that we have already rejected as unworkable if we are to 
maintain the Constitution's enumeration of powers." This mixed question of fact and law 
was, the majority concluded, for the judiciary. 
145. Id. at 1760 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
146. O'Neill, Undoing, supra note 140, at 210-33. 
147. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 46 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2132. 
148. See id. at 42, 45, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2128, 2131-32. 
149. Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
883, 894 (2000). 
150. Cf Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 558-59 
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
151. See Kamisar, supra note 149, at 910 (giving five reasons for disbelieving 
Committee's analysis on the constitutionality of § 3501). 
152. Professor Kamisar does point to a "conspicuous absence of any law professors at 
subcommittee hearings" as one reason for not crediting the Senate Judiciary Committee's 
report. Id. at 902. While I am sure many of us in the academy will find merit in Kamisar's 
suggestion that academics are vital to congressional deliberations, this is no requirement for 
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cuss statistical presentations made to the Senate Judiciary Committee 
by, among others, District Attorney Frank Hogan of New York 
County,153 then-District Attorney Arlen Spector of Philadelphia,154 and 
District Attorney Aaron Koota of Kings County, New York.155 While 
one might draw different conclusions from this data,156 Congress's de­
termination does seem to be, at the very least, one quite reasonable 
interpretation. Traditionally, reasonableness is all that the Court has 
required of Congress in evaluating the factual underpinnings of legis­
lation.157 
Alternatively, the Court might have concluded that the congres­
sional determinations had become outdated by the time Dickerson ar­
rived at the Court in 2000, since Congress reached its conclusions in 
1968. Yet it is hard to understand how congressional findings could be 
made to have any sort of expiration date, particularly where more re­
cent congressional hearings have tended to reaffirm Congress's earlier 
action.158 More importantly, Miranda itself was predicated on the 
promise that its rules would not "constitute an undue interference 
with a proper system of law enforcement."159 Miranda's predictive 
claim - made, of course, in 1966 without the benefit of real world 
evaluation of the new rules160 - would have to give way to congres­
sional factfinding based on their actual operation. 
Faced with such unattractive grounds for dealing with the congres­
sional findings, Dickerson adopted a remarkable approach: it ignored 
crediting legislative findings. Also, other defenders of Miranda did testify at the hearings. 
See, e.g. , Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th 
Cong. 1 159 (1967) (hereinafter Controlling Crime Hearings) (statement of Vincent L. 
Broderick on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union). 
153. See id. at 1 120-23. 
154. Id. at 200-02. 
155. Id. at 223. 
156. Compare, e.g., Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 111 ,  at 395-418 (using the studies as 
reason for finding significant harm from Miranda), with Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's 
Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 
500, 516-47 (1996) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Practical Effect] (reading the same studies differ­
ently). 
157. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 82-83 (1981) (in evaluating the constitu­
tionality of a statute, "[t]he District Court was quite wrong in undertaking an independent 
evaluation of this evidence, rather than adopting an appropriately deferential examination of 
Congress' evaluation of that evidence"). 
158. See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 1, at 208-09 (noting congressional hearings urging the 
Justice Department to enforce § 3501); see also infra notes 1 85-196 and accompanying text 
(noting efforts of Senators Hatch and Thurmond to support § 3501). 
159. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 ( 1961). 
160. The Court claimed that the FBI had operated under similar rules, but this claim 
was transparently flawed. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT 
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION 48-49 (1986), 
reprinted in 22 MICH. J.L. REFORM 437, 501-02 (1989) [hereinafter OLP REPORT]. 
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them. In deciding to retain Miranda, the Court simply offered its own 
independent determination that Miranda had not been so harmful as 
to require modification. In brief concluding paragraphs on this issue, 
Dickerson first quoted Chief Justice Burger's concurring view, in a 
1980 case, that " [t]he meaning of Miranda has become reasonably 
clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its stricture; I 
would neither overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late 
date."161 Dickerson next asserted that "Miranda has become embed­
ded in routine police practices to the point where the warnings have 
become part of our national culture"162 and that the Court's "subse­
quent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate 
law enforcement while reaffirming the decision's core ruling . . . . "163 
Finally, the Court maintained that a totality-of-the-circumstances, vol­
untariness test "is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement of­
ficers to conform to . . . .  "164 
What is obviously missing from Dickerson's analysis is any ac­
knowledgment - let alone analysis - of congressional fact-finding on 
these very issues. This was a dramatic departure from the approach of 
Morrison and many other cases recognizing congressional primacy on 
factfinding.165 Moreover, taken on their own merits, the Court's ar­
ticulated reasons for finding Miranda not to be harmful are remarka­
bly weak. With respect to Chief Justice Burger's conclusion that "law 
enforcement practices have adjusted to [Miranda's] strictures," was 
the Chief Justice asserting that law enforcement had accommodated to 
Miranda, thereby avoiding harmful effects? Or, as seems more likely, 
was he saying that law enforcement had reconciled itself to the harm­
ful effects? This latter interpretation of Chief Justice Burger's remarks 
would square his views with those of, for example, the nation's largest 
law enforcement organization, the Fraternal Order of Police.166 When 
deciding how to interpret his remarks, it is instructive that Chief 
Justice Burger, after retiring from the Court, held the view that 
161 .  Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 ,  304 (1980) (Burger, CJ., concurring). 
162. 120 S. Ct. at 2336. 
163. Id. 
1 64. Id. 
165. See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text. 
166. See The Clinton Justice Department's Refusal to Enforce the Law on Voluntary 
Confessions: Hearings . . .  of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (state­
ment of Gilbert G. Gallegos, President of the Grand Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police) 
("Sometimes we hear the claim that police have ' learned to live with Miranda' as an argu­
ment against any change in the rules used in our courts. If what is meant by this is that police 
will do their very best to follow whatever rules the Supreme Court establishes, it is true po­
lice have 'teamed [sic] to live with Miranda' . . .  But if what is meant by this is that police 
'live with' and do not care about the harmful effects of these Court rules, nothing could be 
further from the truth . . .  too often these rules interfere with the ability of police officers to 
solve violent crimes and take dangerous criminals off the streets."). 
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Miranda should be overruled.167 With respect to the Court's subse­
quent cases reducing any harmful impact from Miranda, the Court did 
not acknowledge that these modifications have been around 
Miranda's edges. While the Court has created impeachment, deriva­
tive use, and public safety exceptions, Miranda's basic rule excluding 
non-Mirandized statements from the state's case-in-chief remains in­
tact. The available empirical evidence suggests that these exceptions 
have marginal effects at best. The public safety exception, for instance, 
appears to apply in fewer than 1 % of all cases.168 Moreover, while it is 
true that some post-Miranda issues have been resolved in favor of law 
enforcement, it is equally true that others have been resolved in favor 
of criminal defendants. No less a defender of Miranda than the re­
doubtable Yale Kamisar has acknowledged that "it must also be said 
that the new Court has interpreted Miranda fairly generously in some 
important respects. "169 Those important respects include the waiver 
rules dealing with the circumstances in which police can even ask 
questions of suspects. In 1981, the Court in Edwards v. Arizona cre­
ated an absolute bar to questioning a suspect who requests counsel. 170 
In later decisions, the Court applied this "second layer of prophy­
laxis"171 to questioning about even unrelated crimes172 and even to 
questioning after counsel had been provided.173 It is precisely these 
rules that law enforcement agencies like the FBI have identified as 
producing most of Miranda's harm.174 It is thus entirely possible that 
167. Interview with Timothy Flannigan, biographer of Chief Justice Burger, in 
Washington, D.C. (Apr. 6, 2001). Part of his reasoning may have been that, contrary to his 
1980 position that Miranda should neither be "disparaged" nor "extended," the Court had in 
fact extended Miranda in various ways, including in particular the line of cases originating 
with Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), which significantly restricts the ability of law 
enforcement officers to question suspects. It is this line of cases that has been identified by 
federal law enforcement agencies as creating the most harmful effects from Miranda. See 
infra note 188 and accompanying text (noting FBI difficulties under Edwards line of cases). 
168. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Em­
pirical Study of the Effects a/Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 884-85 (1986). 
169. YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS, 
AND QUESTIONS 509 (9th ed. 1999); see also Kamisar, Congress, supra note 13, at 951 
("[N]ot all the opinions written in confession cases over the past thirty years have saddened 
the hearts of Miranda's friends."). 
170. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
171. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991). 
172. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988). 
173. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990). 
174. See Brief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Agents Association as Amicus 
Curiae, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525); supra note 167 
(noting concern of FBI about Edwards). 
Edwards has been arguably weakened in one small respect. In Davis v. United States, 512 
U.S. 452 (1994), the Court held that a request for counsel had to be unambiguous to trigger 
the questioning cutoff rules once a suspect had waived his right. Here again, however, the 
empirical evidence suggests that this modification has not been particularly useful for law 
enforcement. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 168, at 860 (explaining that only 2.3% of cases 
930 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:898 
the Court's recent modifications have increased, not decreased, 
Miranda's societal' costs. Dickerson makes no attempt to assay the net 
effect of the Court's varying decisions. 
Finally, Dickerson's claim that it is more difficult for law enforce­
ment officers to comply with a voluntariness test than deliver Miranda 
warning demolishes a strawman. Federal officers were planning to de­
liver Miranda warnings even if § 3501 had been upheld,175 which means 
that whatever useful effect they provided law enforcement would have 
been continued. In addition, the brightness of Miranda's "bright-line" 
rule has also been oversold. Justice O'Connor, for example, wrote just 
a few years before Dickerson that "Miranda creates as many close 
questions as it resolves"176 - a position that she simply abandoned 
(without explanation) in joining the Dickerson opinion.177 But in the 
final analysis, the overarching issue remains not how bright the rule is, 
but the costs of the rule. Dickerson simply fails to offer any assessment 
of these costs. 
Setting aside the particular problems with Dickerson's specific 
authorities, a more fundamental point is the Court's judicial vantage 
point on Miranda. The Brethren all are handicapped in assessing the 
harmful effects of restraints on law enforcement practices. By defini­
tion, the Justices receive information only about cases that were suc­
cessfully prosecuted - that is, cases in which police and prosecutors 
were able to amass sufficient evidence to pursue the case (and ulti­
mately have it find its way to the Supreme Court). In other words, 
only cases that are formally charged fall within the ken of the judicial 
system. The bulk of Miranda's costs lie hidden elsewhere - in cases 
where Miranda prevents police from ever obtaining confessions vital 
to successful prosecutions. In a trilogy of recent articles, I have offered 
three different ways of calculating these hidden costs of Miranda: 
through "before-after" studies of confession rates, analysis of the drop 
in crime clearance rates after Miranda, and comparison of contempo­
rary confession rates with those that prevailed at the time of 
Miranda118 In 1968, the Senate Judiciary Committee looked at these 
involved post-waiver invocations of rights, and all of those cases involved suspects who had 
previously given incriminating information). The three cases involved suspects who had al­
ready given incriminating information. Id. See generally William J. Stuntz, Miranda's Mis­
take, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 988 (2001) (discussing infrequency of those who invoke rights 
after waivers - "Conditional Talkers" in his lexicon). 
175. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. 
176. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 711 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
177. See 120 S. Ct. at 2347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting politely this unexplained rever­
sal by Justice O'Connor). 
178. Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 111; Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Hand­
cuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda 's Harmful Effects on Law Enforce­
ment, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998); Cassell & Hayman, supra note 168. Three additional 
reasons for believing that Miranda harmed law enforcement are the contemporary reports of 
law enforcement officers to that effect, see Paul G. Cassell, Reply, All Benefits, No Costs: 
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very same types of information in reaching its factual conclusion about 
Miranda's harms.179 Dickerson does not explain what to make of the 
social science data on Miranda's effects.180 
B .  Law Enforcement Experience with Miranda 
Perhaps the Court could have compensated for the inadequacies in 
its judicial vantage point by relying on other sources of information. In 
some Miranda cases, for example, the Court has alluded to law en­
forcement experience as a basis for sustaining the Miranda rules.181 
Dickerson, however, does not mention the numerous law enforcement 
amicus briefs in the case - no doubt because these briefs flatly con­
tradicted its position. In fact, what may have been the largest collec­
tion of law enforcement groups ever to file briefs in a 
Supreme Court case supported § 3501. Briefs urging affirmance of the 
Fourth Circuit were filed by seventeen State Attorneys 
General, the National District Attorneys Association, the FBI Agents 
Association, the nation's largest rank and file law enforcement organi­
zation (the Fraternal Order of Police), the nation's second largest rank 
and file law enforcement organization (the National Association of 
Police Organizations), the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police, and a number of other groups.182 On the other side, not even a 
The Grand Illusion of Miranda's Defenders, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1084, 1106-10 (1996); the 
higher confession rates found in Britain and Canada, see Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 
111 ,  at 418-22; Cassell & Hayman, supra note 168, at 876-80; and the decline in innocent sus­
pects who are exonerated through confessions, see Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent 
from False Confessions and Lost Confessions - And From Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 497, 551 (1998). These positions, of course, have not been universally ac­
cepted by legal academics. Compare, e.g., Schulhofer, Practical Effect, supra note 156, 
George C. Thomas III, Is Miranda a Real-World Failure? A Plea for More (and Better) Em­
pirical Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821 (1996), and John J. Donahue III, Did Miranda Di­
minish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN . L. REV. 1147 (1998), with, e.g., Laurie Magid, The 
Miranda Debate: Questions Past, Present, and Future, 36 Hous. L. REV. 1251, 1286 (1999) 
(book review) ("Professor Cassell's research is important because it does remind us that 
Miranda imposes a cost on thousands of cases."). 
179. See, e.g., Controlling Crime Hearings, supra note 152, at 199, 726, 1092. 
180. See Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First 
Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1010-11 (2001); Klein, supra note 7, at 1075-76. 
181. See, e.g., Withrow, 507 U.S. at 713 (citing amicus brief from law enforcement 
agency as a reason for not contracting Miranda). 
182. The briefs are available on the Cassell website, supra note 44. The brief from the 
IACP was nominally "in support of neither party" but was in substance fully supportive of 
the Fourth Circuit's opinion. Brief of Amici Curiae for Americans for Effective Law 
Enforcement, Inc., Joined by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., the 
National Sheriffs' Association, and the Virginia Association of Chiefs of Police, in Support 
of Neither Party, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525), available 
at Cassell website, supra note 44. 
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single prominent law enforcement group would support Dickerson's 
position.183 
The Court did have one brief from a law enforcement agency 
claiming that Miranda was not harmful. The Department of Justice's 
brief claimed that "federal law enforcement agencies have concluded 
that the Miranda decision itself generally does not hinder their inves­
tigations." 184 But this statement had been so thoroughly discredited by 
the time of the oral argument that the Court understandably gave it no 
weight. 
After the Department filed its brief containing these representa­
tions, Senators Orrin Hatch and Strom Thurmond wrote to the 
Attorney General that they had received information that the Drug 
Enforcement Administration had reached the opposite conclusion and 
requested that the Attorney General "provide to us at your earliest 
convenience an explanation for the seemingly misleading statements" 
contained in the Department's brief.185 With its hand forced, the 
Department of Justice released documents from federal law enforce­
ment agencies about the effects of Miranda and lodged them with the 
Court. The lodged materials came from a number of federal agencies, 
including some (like the Internal Revenue Service) that presumably 
only rarely conduct custodial interrogations and therefore only rarely 
suffer any harm from the Miranda rules. Buried at the end of the 
lodging were several memos from the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, the federal agency that probably conducts a higher 
percentage of custodial interrogations than any other federal law en­
forcement agency. As had apparently been reported to Senators 
Hatch and Thurmond, these memos indicated that the DEA had suf­
fered serious harms from Miranda. In an undated memo written in 
1998 by the DEA's Deputy Chief Counsel, the DEA explained that it 
was in favor of the Department attempting to obtain a favorable ruling 
on § 3501.186 In a memo dated October 13, 1999, the DEA's Chief of 
183. A brief was filed by individual police officers supporting Dickerson, which also 
contained two minor law enforcement groups: the Police Foundation and the National Black 
Police Association (not to be confused with the National Organization of Black Law 
Enforcement Executives, the far more prominent representative of African-American law 
enforcement officers). Brief of Griffin B. Bell et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525). But the attorneys working on this brief were 
unable to secure the assent of even a single major law enforcement organization for their 
position, despite the fact (I have been reliably informed) that they called many of the same 
nationally prominent groups that ultimately supported the Fourth Circuit. 
184. Brief for the United States at 34, Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525). 
185. Letter from Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Strom Thurmond to Attorney General 
Janet Reno (Feb. 15, 2000) (available on Cassell website, supra note 44); see also 146 CONG. 
REC. S760 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2000) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). 
186. Letter from Robert C. Gleason, Deputy Chief Counsel, Drug Enforcement 
Agency, to Patty Stemler, Chief, Dep't of Justice Criminal Div., Appellate Section (undated) 
(available on Cassell website, supra note 44). 
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Operations reported that the agency's experience "highlight[ s] the 
need to reform the formal, prophylactic requirements of Miranda."187 
Joining the DEA, the FBI also reported that offshoots of the Miranda 
requirements, such as the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, have had "an 
impact on numerous FBI investigations."188 As Senators Hatch and 
Thurmond concluded after reviewing these materials, they seriously 
undermine the impression created by the United States' merits brief 
"that federal law enforcement agencies uniformly support the Justice 
Department's decision in this case to challenge the constitutionality of 
18 U.S.C. § 3501."189 
Yet the Department was not finished with its misleading effort to 
minimize Miranda's damaging effects on federal law enforcement. The 
Department came up with new statistics in its reply brief - filed 
shortly before the oral argument. The Department's reply brief as­
serted that, between 1989 and 1999, "according to the Justice 
Department's records, federal courts suppressed approximately 78 
statements under Miranda - i.e., one out of every 9,300 federal 
prosecutions."190 This representation must have come as something of 
a surprise to Senators on the Judiciary Committee. Several 
Senators had previously requested from the Department comprehen­
sive information about federal cases in which Miranda problems had 
prevented prosecution so that they could illustrate the harms from 
Miranda. In a 1997 response to the Senators, the Justice Department 
had answered that " [t]he Department's filing system and records do 
not readily yield a definitive list of such cases."191 The Department 
therefore provided to the Senators only a list of cases in which "ad-
187. Letter from Richard A. Fiano, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Agency, to 
Frank A.S. Campbell, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Policy Development, 
Drug Enforcement Agency (Oct. 13, 1999) (available on Cassell website, supra note 44). In a 
curious attempt to undercut these memos written in the ordinary course of business, the 
DEA's politically-appointed General Counsel wrote a memo on February 22, 2000 Gust two 
days before the Department's lodging with the Court and after the request from Senators 
Hatch and Thurmond), that attempted to "clarify" some of the statements made in the ear­
lier memos. Letter from Cynthia R. Ryan, Chief Counsel, Drug Enforcement Agency, to 
Seth P. Waxman, Solicitor General, Dep't of Justice (Feb. 22, 2000) (available on Cassell 
website, supra note 44). 
188. Letter from Larry R. Parkinson, General Counsel, Federal Bureau of 
Investigations, to Eleanor D. Acheson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Policy 
Development, Drug Enforcement Agency (Oct. 1 9, 1999) (available on Cassell website, su­
pra note 44). 
189. Letter from Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Strom Thurmond to Attorney General 
Janet Reno, supra note 185. 
190. Reply Brief for the United States at 17-18, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 
2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525). 
1 9 1 .  Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative 
Affairs, Dep't of Justice, to Senator Fred Thompson (Nov. 5, 1997), reprinted in The Clinton 
Justice Department's Refusal to Enforce the Law on Voluntary Confessions: Hearing before 
the Senate Subcomm. on Crim. Justice Oversight of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th 
Cong. at 124 (1999). 
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verse Miranda rulings made by the federal courts have been reviewed 
by the Solicitor General," an incomplete list which "no doubt excludes 
a number of cases in which confessions were suppressed under 
Miranda . . . .  "192 It was this same incomplete list that the Department 
was now attempting to pass off to the Court as a firm accounting of 
Miranda's harm to law enforcement. A few days after the Department 
filed its reply brief, Senators Orrin Hatch and Strom Thurmond sent a 
letter to the Attorney General (with a copy to the Supreme Court) 
powerfully challenging the accuracy of those figures. The Senators' 
letter included more than eighty additional cases of statements sup­
pressed under Miranda that were not included in the Department's 
calculations (more than doubling the figures the 
Department itself had come up with!)  and explained how the 
Department's representations were seriously misleading.193 Two days 
later, the Solicitor General sent a letter to the Supreme Court admit­
ting that dozens of the cases identified by the Senators were not in­
cluded in the Department's calculations.194 
While the misrepresentations in the Department's brief to the 
Court are very troubling, perhaps even more disturbing was the 
Department's refusal to give weight to the congressional findings of 
harm. While the Department's brief tersely mentioned the congres­
sional findings,195 the Department nonetheless believed it was free to 
revisit the evidence on its own rather than follow its traditional role of 
defending congressional laws and conclusions.196 It was only because of 
Senators Hatch and Thurmond's prompt response that this strategy 
did not succeed in keeping from the Court considerable evidence of 
Miranda's harm. 
This evidence of harm posed a dilemma to the Dickerson majority 
on the stare decisis question. It was no doubt aware that the potential 
costs of the Dickerson decision were crucial to any stare decisis calcu­
lus. At the same time, the Court was confronted with a congressional 
determination that Miranda's costs were substantial, findings sup-
192 Id. 
193. Letter from Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Strom Thurmond to Attorney General 
Janet Reno and Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman (Apr. 18, 2000) (available on Cassell 
website, supra note 44). 
194. Letter from Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman to General William K. Suter, Clerk, 
United States Supreme Court (Apr. 20, 2000) (available on Cassell website, supra note 44). 
195. Brief for the United States at 1 9-20, Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-
5525). 
196. See generally Cassell, supra note 1 ,  at 223-25 (criticizing the Department for failing 
to defend § 3501). Cf Neal Devins, Asking the Right Questions: How the Courts Honored the 
Separation of Powers by Reconsidering Miranda, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (2000) (discussing 
whether courts should have considered the statute without Justice Department prompting); 
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have Remained Silent: Why the Court Erred in De­
ciding Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 287 (2000) (same). 
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ported by numerous social science studies, law enforcement amicus 
briefs, and the recent conclusions of the DEA and FBI. In the face of 
this evidence, any serious effort by the Court to grapple with the stare 
decisis issues would have required the Court to acknowledge that 
Congress could have reasonably concluded that dangerous criminals 
were going free because of Miranda. Instead, the Court took the easy 
way out - it dodged the issue. 
* * * * * 
In short, what the Court could have said in Dickerson was this: 
There is a factual question about whether Miranda has harmed legiti­
mate law enforcement efforts. Congress is the branch of government 
charged with resolving such questions. Congress held hearings on this 
subject and reasonably concluded that Miranda was seriously ham­
pering police efforts to solve crime and convict criminals. As a re­
sult, . . . . .  
V. ALTERNATIVES TO MIRANDA 
what would have been the result of Dickerson properly ac­
knowledging that there was harm to law enforcement from Miranda? 
Does it necessarily follow that Miranda should have been overruled? 
Such harm would, at a minimum, be relevant to the Court's calcu­
lation whether to retain Miranda or return to the earlier voluntariness 
regime. The Court's stare decisis jurisprudence explicitly acknowl­
edges the relevance of real-world effects. In deciding whether to over­
rule Roe v. Wade, for instance, the controlling opinion from the Court 
described the decision to overrule as "customarily informed by a series 
of prudential and pragmatic considerations . . . .  "197 These considera­
tions include "the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a 
prior case."198 On this view, the "costs" of the Miranda rules are indis­
putably part of the stare decisis calculation.199 
197. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
198. Id. (emphasis added). 
199. As the Court's references to "costs" makes clear, the Court's own stare decisis ju­
risprudence directly supplies an answer to Professor Susan Klein's query as to why data on 
lost convictions should be relevant to Miranda jurisprudence. See Klein, supra note 7, at 
1076 n.204. But Miranda doctrine as well has long made costs and benefits directly relevant. 
See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n.4 (1986) (describing Miranda as "a carefully 
crafted balance designed to fully protect both the defendant's and society's interests"). Even 
Miranda's most ardent supporters seem to agree. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The "Police Prac­
tice" Phases of the Criminal Process and the Three Phases of the Burger Court, in THE 
BURGER YEARS 143, 150 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987) (noting that striking a balance "is the 
way Miranda's defenders - not its critics - have talked about the case for the past twenty 
years"); Schulhofer, Practical Effect, supra note 156, at 505 (agreeing that "the size of a legal 
problem does matter"); see generally Tracey L. Meares & Bernard Harcourt, Transparent 
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Starting from the proper premise that Congress reasonably found 
Miranda to entail significant costs, it would have been interesting to 
see how the Court then assessed the competing issues.200 Just exactly 
how many murderers and armed robbers would the Court find it 
worth setting free in the interests of retaining the Miranda rule? The 
Court has not proven particularly adept at assessing such tradeoffs.201 
In Miranda itself, for example, the Court appeared to balance com­
peting concerns in ways that most Americans found objectionable. 
Rather than linger over such difficult issues, it is understandable that 
the Court simply chose to toss off cursory assertions about Miranda's 
limited harm before galloping off to its disposition, leaving the hard 
questions to be answered in, . . .  er . . .  , later law review symposia.202 
But assuming that the Court had recognized Miranda's harms, 
would overruling the decision have necessarily followed? Against 
Miranda's disadvantages, the Court would have needed to assay the 
advantages. Defenders of Miranda have claimed, for example, that 
Miranda entails such benefits as reducing police coercion during the 
questioning of suspects203 and communicating to suspects "our societal 
commitment to restraint in an area in which emotions easily run un­
controlled."204 Balancing these advantages against Miranda's disadvan­
tages would have been difficult not only because of disagreement 
about the existence of these benefits, but more generally because of a 
commensurability problem - these concerns are not susceptible to 
evaluation on a common scale. 
A critique of Dickerson for reaching one conclusion or the other 
on such contentious issues would probably never command broad as-
Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733 (2000). 
200. To be clear, my argument is that the Court should have accepted Congress's factual 
findings on harm (criminals going free), not that it should have deferred to the congressional 
determination that interrogations are not inherently coercive. This latter conclusion, a mixed 
question of fact and law, presents a more difficult case for deference to congressional find­
ings than the purely factual findings discussed in the text. See generally Cassell, supra note 1 ,  
a t  249 n.355 (collecting authorities on  the not-inherently-coercive argument). 
201. Cf Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims' 
Rights Amendment, 1 999 UTAH L. REV. 479 (discussing failures of the criminal justice sys­
tem in recognizing victims' rights). 
202. Cf Kamisar, supra note 7, at 897 (stating that Dickerson basically said, "Let the 
professors figure it out."). 
203. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 621, 678 (1996). For a competing view of the evidence on this point, see, e.g., 
Cassell, supra note 111 ,  at 473-78. 
204. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 460 (1987). 
For competing views of the message sent by Miranda, see, e.g., JOSEPH D. GRANO, 
CONFESSIONS, TRUTH AND THE LAW (1996); Stephen J. Markman, The Fifth Amendment 
and Custodial Questioning: A Response to "Reconsidering Miranda," 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 938, 
948 (1987). 
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sent.205 But it seems to me that an alternative critique is available, 
which might draw wider approval. Even assuming that the Court 
properly struck down § 3501, the Dickerson opinion is deficient in 
failing to discuss possible alternatives to Miranda that Congress could 
adopt. Dickerson 's silence on reasonable alternatives starkly contrasts 
with City of Chicago v. Morales,206 a case from the preceding Term. In 
Morales, the Court struck down Chicago's gang-loitering ordinance 
essentially on vagueness grounds. But the swing justices - Justice 
O'Connor joined by Justice Breyer - wrote a concurring opinion ex­
plaining how Chicago could cure the defects. This led 
Chicago to adopt a new ordinance conforming precisely to the re­
quirements spelled out in the concurring opinion. Justice O'Connor's 
Morales concurrence illustrates what Professor Erik Luna has help­
fully called a "constitutional roadmap."207 The controlling justices on 
the Court gave guidance to Chicago so that Chicago's city council 
could pass an ordinance that complied with the Constitution. 
Dickerson should have followed Justice O'Connor's approach in 
Morales - offering some instruction about why § 3501 and related en­
actments were defective and what the Congress needed to do to sup­
plement them. Perhaps some constitutional purists will demur. Tout­
ing passive virtues and the like,208 they will suggest that the Court 
should take the cases one at a time, leaving the possibility of alterna­
tives to be resolved in a proper case and controversy. In many circum­
stances, such arguments for judicial restraint might have considerable 
force. But in the particular context of Miranda, the case for roadmap­
ping becomes compelling.209 Miranda is "a decision without a past"210 
- an opinion without foundation in the previous court precedents.211 
As a result, in contrast with other bodies of law, conscientious legisla­
tors lack authoritative guidance for any effort to determine what al­
ternatives might satisfy the constitutional requirements. Dickerson of-
205. For this reason, among others, I have argued for replacing Miranda rather than 
overruling it. 
206. 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999). 
207. Erik Luna, Constitutional Roadmaps, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1125 (2000). 
208. See Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L REV. 40 
(1961). See generally Luna, supra note 207, at 1 173-85 (discussing various theories of inter­
branch dialogue). 
209. To be clear, Professor Luna reserves "for another day" the question of whether the 
Court's "disinclination toward hearing political alternatives can serve as a constitutionally 
legitimate motivation for judicial decisionmaking and opinion writing." Luna, supra note 
207, at 1236 n.543. I want to argue here that, at least in the context of replacements for 
Miranda, such disinclination is illegitimate, or at least inadvisable. 
210. OLP REPORT, supra note 160, reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 564 (1989). 
21 1 .  See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's "Negligible" Effect on Law Enforcement: Some 
Skeptical Observations, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 327, 328 (1997) (collecting authorities 
on this point). 
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fers no help to the legislature, since it merely offers an unexplained 
"thumbs down" to the alternative before it, § 3501. Perhaps uncer­
tainty might be tolerable if the legislature could simply authorize a test 
case to explore the acceptability of alternatives to Miranda. But the 
ability to test alternatives before the Court is limited. A decision by a 
police agency to depart from Miranda and try some different device 
risks suppression of a confession. If applied more widely - as might 
be necessary to obtain appellate review of the issue212 - it runs the 
risk of wholesale reversal of criminal convictions, years after the fact. 
Dickerson was clearly an "opportunity missed"213 to make positive 
reforms, and will continue the "petrification" of the law of pretrial in­
terrogation in this country.214 For those who think Miranda is the be­
all and end-all of rules for this area, perhaps this result will be ap­
plauded. But it would be odd if a 1966, 5-4 decision by the 
Supreme Court embodied the best possible resolution of the compet­
ing concerns. Indeed, this Symposium provides considerable evidence 
of dissatisfaction with Miranda from various quarters. For instance, 
Professor Laurie Magid and I are concerned that Miranda unduly 
harms law enforcement.215 But setting such concerns aside for the mo­
ment, it is interesting to hear from Professor Welsh White that 
Miranda fails to restrain pernicious interrogation practices,216 from 
Professor Richard Leo that Miranda has few significant benefits,217 and 
from Professor Susan Klein that Miranda fails to provide any real 
guidance on what kinds of compulsion are permissible during police 
questioning.218 Given these complaints, it is hard to fault Professor 
William Stuntz's conclusion that "Miranda should attract support from 
neither right nor left."219 
This Symposium also provides considerable evidence for the solu­
tion to Miranda defects - the proverbial "win-win" solution that 
properly protects both suspects and society's legitimate interests. 
Dickerson should have suggested to Congress that it consider replac­
ing Miranda with a system of videotaping police questioning. Video­
taping of interrogations improves on Miranda by providing an objec-
212. Cf Cassell, supra note 1, at 200-19 (reviewing protracted litigation involved in get­
ting § 3501 before the Supreme Court). 
213. Stuntz, supra note 174, at 976. 
214. See OLP REPORT, supra note 160, at 99, reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
548-49. 
215. See Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 1 168 (2001); supra Parts IV.A-B. 
216. White, supra note 76, at 1220-21 
217. Leo, supra note 180, at 1027. 
218. Klein, supra note 7, at 1035. 
219. Stuntz, supra note 174, at 976. 
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tive record of what happened inside the stationhouse.220 Videotaping 
thus allows courts to police the lines between proper and improper 
tactics, rather than leaving that job to others.221 Videotaping would 
also help reduce the number of wrongful convictions from false con­
fessions by revealing those rare cases where suspects (particularly the 
mentally retarded) are led to confess to crimes they did not commit.222 
I have argued elsewhere that videotaping could largely replace the 
Miranda regirne.223 Other commentators - including prominently 
Stephen Schulhofer, Welsh White, and Richard Leo - have urged 
that videotaping should supplement the Miranda regime.224 And be­
tween these varying positions there certainly are a range of possibili­
ties for using videotaping in combination with various parts of the 
Miranda regirne.225 Yet the Court's opinion in Dickerson contains not 
even the briefest discussion of this (or other) alternatives226 - it gives 
no roadmap for legislators to follow. The result, not surprisingly, has 
been inaction in Congress and legislatures on possible alternatives to 
Miranda.227 
Reasonable people can disagree about exactly which of these vari­
ous alternatives would have been preferable. But if this 
Symposium suggests nothing else, it is that society has compelling rea-
220. See Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 111 ,  at 486-92. 
221. See Stuntz, supra note 174, at 999. 
222. See Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 111,  at 488-89; Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and 
the "Innocent": An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False Con-
fessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523, 582-84 (1999). 
. . 
223. See Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 111 ,  at 486-98; Cassell & Fowles, supra note 
178, at 1 130. 
224. See Leo, supra note 180, at 1028-29; Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The 
Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the 
Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 429, 494-96 (1998); 
Schulhofer, Practical Effect, supra note 156, at 503; Welsh S. White, False Confessions and 
the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 105, 154-55 (1997). 
225. For interesting arguments along these lines, see Friedman & Dorf, supra note 16; 
DONALD DRIPPS, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY FOR CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: DICKERSON, 
MIRANDA , AND THE CONTINUING QUEST FOR BROAD-BUT-SHALLOW (2000) (arguing that 
videotaping could replace the Edwards rules). My proposed videotape replacement for 
Miranda also retains parts of the Miranda regime. See Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 111 ,  
at  486-98. 
226. Another often-discussed alternative to Miranda is the questioning of suspects by 
magistrates rather than police officers. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 77 (1997); see also Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Ac­
cused - A  Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224 (1932). 
227. See Luna, supra note 207, at 1236-38 n.544. 
The only post-Dickerson response in Congress was the introduction of a bill by Senator 
Leahy that would have repealed the operative provisions of § 3501. S. 2830, 106th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (2000). The bill went nowhere in the 106th Congress. Presumably the majority in Con­
gress prefers the approach of § 3501, as evidenced by the amicus briefs in Dickerson, see su­
pra note 130 and accompanying text. 
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sons constantly to examine how to improve its regulations of police in­
terrogation. Miranda itself recognizes this point. Miranda went out of 
its way pointedly to "encourage Congress and the States to continue 
their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the 
rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our 
criminal laws."228 The Miranda Court explained that "we cannot say 
that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular 
solution" to the issues lurking in police questioning of suspects.229 
"Our decision," promised Miranda, "in no way creates a constitutional 
straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it in­
tended to have that effect. "230 
Thirty-four years later, the Dickerson Court chose not to repeat 
this encouragement to Congress and the states; nor did it renew 
Miranda's promise to avoid creating a constitutional straitjacket. In­
stead, making a virtue out of vice, Dickerson tells us that the Miranda 
procedures have become part of our "national culture"231 - a cultural 
straitjacket presumably not susceptible to reform. 
Miranda needs reform - a point many in this Symposium have 
advanced. The true tragedy of Dickerson is, then, not the path that the 
Court chose - but the paths that it seemingly foreclosed. 
228. 384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added). 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. 120 S. Ct. at 2336. 
